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OWNING MARIJUANA
JOHN G. SPRANKLING*
ABSTRACT
Legal marijuana is the fastest-growing industry in the United States.
It is premised on the assumption that marijuana ownership will be
protected by law. But can marijuana be owned? This Article is the first
scholarship to explore the issue.
Federal law classifies marijuana as contraband per se in which
property rights cannot exist. Yet the Article demonstrates that marijuana
can now be owned under the law of most states, even though no state
statutes or decisions expressly address the issue. This conflict presents a
fundamental question of federalism: Can property rights exist under
state law if they are forbidden by federal law? The Article explains why
federal law does not preempt state law on marijuana ownership.
This result creates a paradox: state courts and other state authorities
will protect property rights in marijuana, but their federal counterparts
will not. The Article analyzes the challenges arising from this hybrid
approach to marijuana ownership. It also examines the fragmented
status of marijuana ownership in the interstate context, where personal
relationships or business transactions involve states with conflicting
approaches to the issue.
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INTRODUCTION
A plans to divorce B, who operates a marijuana1 store, and obtain
a share of B’s marijuana in the dissolution proceeding. C intends to
make a loan to D that is secured by an interest in D’s marijuana. E
sues F for damages after F negligently burns E’s marijuana crop.
These hypothetical situations all present the same question: Can
marijuana be owned?

1. Marijuana consists of leaves, buds, and other parts of the plant Cannabis sativa L. 21
U.S.C. § 802(16) (2012). Accordingly, some authorities refer to it as “cannabis.” However, this
Article uses the term “marijuana” because this word is more commonly used in U.S. law at
present. This Article examines property rights in marijuana itself and, by extension, in products
that contain marijuana or its active ingredient, tetrahydrocannabinol. See infra note 53. Thus, all
references to “marijuana” include both marijuana and marijuana products unless the context
indicates otherwise.
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The traditional answer was “no” because federal and state laws
uniformly criminalized the possession and transfer of marijuana.2 The
question arises today because thirty-three states have now legalized
these actions, although they are still illegal under federal law.3 Yet no
case or statute expressly addresses the issue. The legalization tidal
wave has generated extensive scholarship on the criminal and
constitutional issues that it poses.4 But less attention has been devoted
to exploring how legalization affects relationships among private
actors. This Article is the first scholarship to explore whether
marijuana can be owned.5
The distinction between property and nonproperty is
fundamental. As a general matter, the law protects property—such as
rights in a home—from interference by private parties or government
actors. By definition, nonproperty receives no protection. Yet the
determination of what constitutes property is traditionally governed
by state law, not federal law.6 Legalization naturally leads to the
questions of whether property rights in marijuana can arise under
state law and, if so, to what extent the federal government and other
states must respect those rights.
These issues are important because legal marijuana is the fastestgrowing industry in the United States.7 Over 34 million American

2. Marijuana is considered to be contraband per se under federal law. As a result, it is
subject to seizure by federal authorities without any payment or judicial process. See infra text
accompanying notes 61–74.
3. See infra text accompanying notes 77, 81. States that have legalized marijuana, either
for medical use or for all purposes, are collectively referred to in this Article as “legalization
states,” while those that continue to criminalize it are referred to as “ban states.” States that
have legalized marijuana for all purposes are referred to as “full legalization states,” while those
that have legalized it only for medical purposes are referred to as “medical marijuana states.”
4. See, e.g., Lea Brilmayer, A General Theory of Preemption: With Comments on State
Decriminalization of Marijuana, 58 B.C. L. REV. 895 (2017); Erwin Chemerinsky et al.,
Cooperative Federalism and Marijuana Regulation, 62 UCLA L. REV. 74 (2015); Scott W. Howe,
Constitutional Clause Aggregation and the Marijuana Crimes, 75 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 779
(2018); Robert A. Mikos, On the Limits of Supremacy: Medical Marijuana and the States’
Overlooked Power to Legalize Federal Crime, 62 VAND. L. REV. 1421 (2009); Don Stemen,
Beyond the Wars: The Evolving Nature of the U.S. Approach to Drugs, 11 HARV. L. & POL’Y
REV. 375 (2017).
5. This Article does not address property rights in land, vehicles, aircraft, equipment, and
other assets that are used in connection with marijuana cultivation, processing, or sale. Such
items are classified as derivative contraband under federal law, not contraband per se. See infra
text accompanying notes 50–51.
6. See infra text accompanying notes 23–41.
7. Chris Bennett, Marijuana Farming Is Now for US Agriculture, Jan. 8, 2018,
https://www.agweb.com/article/marijuana-farming-is-now-for-us-agriculture-naa-chris-bennett/.
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adults use marijuana regularly,8 and thousands of new businesses have
arisen to serve their needs.9 The revenue from legal marijuana sales
may exceed $13 billion in 2019, and is projected to almost double by
2022.10 Yet the legal marijuana industry is premised on the assumption
that marijuana ownership will be protected by state law, despite the
looming threat posed by contrary federal law. If property rights in
marijuana cannot exist, this industry will eventually die, harming
millions of Americans.
This Article demonstrates that marijuana can be owned under
state law, despite conflicting federal law. More broadly, it explores a
fundamental issue in our federal system—the respective roles of
federal and state governments in defining “property”—and provides a
template for navigating future property conflicts of this kind.
Part I of this Article examines the background doctrines that
shape the analysis of property rights in marijuana: the positivistic view
that “property” consists of legally-protected rights, not things, and the
traditional primacy of state law in defining property rights.
Part II demonstrates that that property rights in marijuana do
exist in legalization states pursuant to state law, but not under federal
law. Broadly speaking, marijuana can be owned within certain
parameters as a matter of state law. The Article then explores the
uneasy tension between federal and state law on the issue, and
analyzes the challenges arising from this hybrid approach to
marijuana ownership.
Part III examines the fragmented status of marijuana property in
the interstate context. Marijuana property conflicts may arise from
relationships or transactions that involve both a legalization state and
a ban state. These conflicts pose the risk that the ban state may
undercut the property rights that exist in the legalization state.The
Article analyzes how contract clauses, choice-of-law principles, and
comity can be used to minimize this risk.
8. Yahoo News/Marist Poll, Weed & The American Family, Apr. 17, 2017,
http://maristpoll.marist.edu/wp-content/misc/Yahoo%20News/20170417_Summary%20Yahoo%
20News-Marist%20Poll_Weed%20and%20The%20American%20Family.pdf (finding that
34,688,319 Americans who are 18 or older use marijuana “regularly,” defined as “at least once
or twice a month”).
9. Roger Vincent, Here’s why pot sellers are paying prime rents for warehouse and
storefront space, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 31, 2018, https://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-cannabisreal-estate-20180331-story.html.
10. Ed Keating, 2019 Marijuana Industry Predictions and Trends, cannabiz media, Dec. 19,
2018, https://cannabiz.media/2019-marijuana-industry-predictions-and-trends/.
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Finally, Part IV explores how potential permanent solutions to the
marijuana debate may affect property rights. If legislation were
adopted to legalize marijuana at the national level, regardless of
conflicting state laws, it should be given retroactive effect. Under the
more likely solution—where each state may choose whether to
legalize marijuana—ban states should be required to respect
marijuana property located in legalization states.
I. PROPERTY AND FEDERALISM
A. The Bundle of Rights Metaphor
The American property system is founded on legal positivism.11 As
Jeremy Bentham famously remarked: “Property and law are born
together, and die together. Before laws were made there was no
property; take away laws, and property ceases.”12 Thus, “property”
consists of rights enforced by government concerning things.13 If
government will protect a person’s rights in relation to a particular
thing, the person has “property.” Conversely, if government will not
protect such rights, the person has no “property.”
The scope of governmental protection for property rights has two
dimensions: vertical and horizontal. The vertical dimension deals with
the relationship between government actors and private actors; it bars
government actors from unduly interfering with private property,
even though regulation is permitted to a certain degree pursuant to
the police power.14 For example, the Fifth Amendment prohibits
government from confiscating private property unless such

11. See JOHN G. SPRANKLING, UNDERSTANDING PROPERTY LAW 4–5 (4th ed. 2017).
12. JEREMY BENTHAM, THE THEORY OF LEGISLATION 69 (Oceana Publications, Inc.
1975) (1802). See also Felix S. Cohen, Dialogue on Private Property, 9 RUTGERS L. REV. 357,
374 (1954) (“That is property to which the following label can be attached. To the world: Keep
off X unless you have my permission, which I may grant or withhold. Signed: Private citizen.
Endorsed: The State.”).
13. Non-lawyers regularly use the term “property” to refer to an object. SPRANKLING,
supra note 11, at 4. Judges, lawyers, legislators, and law professors also sometimes use the term
in this everyday sense, as a shorthand reference for legally-protected rights in relation to a thing.
For the purposes of this Article, I use the term in its technical sense. Thus, “marijuana
property” as used herein means legal rights in relation to marijuana and marijuana products.
Some scholars, however, have criticized the view that property consists of rights. See generally
Henry E. Smith, Property as the Law of Things, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1691 (2012).
14. See Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922) (“[T]o some extent
values incident to property . . . are enjoyed under an implied limitation and must yield to the
police power.”).
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confiscation serves a public purpose and just compensation is paid.15
The horizontal dimension, in contrast, concerns the role that
government plays in regulating relationships among private actors.
Here government prevents private actors from interfering with the
property rights of others or resolves conflicts among claimants to such
property.
The definition of “property” in a legal sense presents two
questions.16 First, what rights can a person have in relation to a thing?
Second, what things may be the object of these rights? The
conventional answer to the first question is the bundle of rights
metaphor. Courts and scholars define the “bundle of rights that are
commonly characterized as property”17 as including the right to
possess, the right to use, the right to exclude, and the right to
transfer.18
Similarly, the standard answer to the second question is simple, if
unsatisfying: property rights may exist in any thing except to the
extent that some special prohibition exists. In other words, the
baseline assumption in our system is that property rights may exist in
virtually any type of thing, including land and buildings affixed to
land, tangible objects, and intangibles.19 The exceptions to this
principle usually arise from major policy concerns, such as prohibiting
property rights due to democratic values (e.g., votes),20 morality (e.g.,
human beings),21 or risks of widespread economic injury (e.g.,
counterfeit money).22
The logical consequence of the bundle of rights metaphor is that if
the law prohibits a person from holding the core property rights in a
particular thing—such as marijuana—then that person has no
15. U.S. CONST. amend. V, § 3.
16. SPRANKLING, supra note 11, at 4.
17. Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979).
18. See, e.g., Horne v. Dept. of Agric., 135 S. Ct. 2419, 2428 (2015) (observing that a
government program eliminated “the entire ‘bundle’ of property rights in the appropriated
raisins—‘the rights to possess, use and dispose of’ them”) (quoting Loretto v. Teleprompter
Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 435 (1982)). See also SPRANKLING, supra note 11, at 7–9
(discussing rights in bundle).
19. SPRANKLING, supra note 11, at 10–12.
20. Every state prohibits the sale of votes. See Rebecca Murray, Note, Voteauction.net:
Protected Free Speech or Treason?, 5 J. HIGH TECH L. 357, 363–64 n. 51 (2005) (collecting state
statutes).
21. Convention to Suppress the Slave Trade and Slavery arts. 1(1), 2(b), Sept. 25, 1926, 60
L.N.T.S. 253.
22. Counterfeit money is contraband per se, in which no property rights can exist. See infra
notes 44–49.
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property in that thing. Conversely, if no governing law contains such a
prohibition, then the thing may be owned.
B. State Primacy in Defining Property
The boundary between property and nonproperty becomes
blurred where state and federal laws differ about the categories of
things in which property rights may exist.
Dual sovereignty is the heart of federalism. Both the federal
government and the state government may exercise sovereign
authority over certain activities within the state’s territory. This poses
the risk that each government may define property in a somewhat
different manner. But it is well-settled that the definition of
property—including the things in which property rights may exist—is
usually determined by state law.23 As the Supreme Court observed in
Stop the Beach Renourishment v. Florida Department of
Environmental Protection, “[g]enerally speaking, state law defines
property interests . . . .”24 Similarly, in Giles v. California the Court
stressed that “States may allocate property rights as they see fit.”25
The principle that property rights arise from the states, not the
national government, is a core component of the federal system that
the Framers envisioned.26 The foundation of international law is that
each nation-state has sovereignty over its own territory and,
accordingly, has the exclusive right to adopt laws governing how
private actors use that territory, including laws governing property
rights.27 In a broad sense, the Framers envisioned each former colony
as a separate “state,” with a high degree of sovereignty over its
territory. Thus, each state was empowered to craft its own laws
governing property, which might differ to some extent.28 This
allocation of authority made practical sense in that era, when the
principal source of wealth was real property—which by definition was
23. See Melvyn R. Durchslag, Forgotten Federalism: The Takings Clause and Local Land
Use Decisions, 59 MD. L. REV. 464, 494 (2000) (“Property simply does not exist in the absence
of state law.”); Ilya Somin, Federalism and Property Rights, 2011 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 53, 84
(“[T]he content of property rights is determined by state law.”); Stewart E. Sterk, The Federalist
Dimension of Regulatory Takings Jurisprudence, 114 YALE L.J. 203, 257 (2004) (“Property
rights are the product of positive state law.”).
24. 560 U.S. 702, 707 (2010).
25. 554 U.S. 353, 375 (2008). See also Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 55 (1979)
(“[P]roperty interests are created and defined by state law.”).
26. See U.S. CONST. amend X.
27. JOHN G. SPRANKLING, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF PROPERTY 3 (2014).
28. See U.S. CONST. amend. X.
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permanently located within state borders—and personal property that
usually remained within such borders as well.
As James Madison explained in The Federalist:
The powers delegated by the proposed Constitution to the federal
government are few and defined. Those which are to remain in the
State governments are numerous and infinite. . . . The powers
reserved to the several States will extend to all objects which, in
the ordinary course of affairs, concern the lives, liberties, and
properties of the people . . . .29

The Framers structured a national legislature with limited
powers.30 These did not include the power to define property rights
except in two areas: patents and copyrights;31 and “Legislation in all
Cases whatsoever” for the future District of Columbia and “like
Authority” over forts and similar federal installations, which would
presumably include property rights in these regions.32 The Tenth
Amendment specifically provided that “[t]he powers not delegated”
to the federal government—including the power to define property
rights in almost all situations—were “reserved to the States
respectively, or to the people.”33
Under the Constitution, then, the states were to have the
dominant role in the horizontal dimension of property rights: how
government protection of property mediates relationships among
private actors.34 For example, state law regulates the manner in which
property may be acquired in various transactions, including gifts,
purchases, leases, and security interests. It protects property from
interference by non-owners, in contexts ranging from enforcing the
right to exclude to providing a remedy for property damage. It also
determines how property is divided among families (e.g., at divorce or
death) and among business owners (e.g., at the dissolution of a
29. THE FEDERALIST NO. 45, at 292–93 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)
(emphasis added). See also Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991) (quoting this language
with approval).
30. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
31. Id. cl. 8.
32. Id. cl. 17.
33. Id. amend. X.
34. The principal exceptions are (1) patents and copyrights; (2) property rights on federal
installations; and (3) bankruptcy. By regulating patents and copyrights, federal law effectively
supersedes conflicting state laws dealing with intellectual property and thus precludes states
from creating such rights. See supra note 31. Similarly, property rights on federal installations
are exclusively governed by federal law. See supra note 32. Finally, the power of Congress to
establish bankruptcy laws necessarily means that federal law will impact state-created property
rights of creditors. U.S. CONST. art I., § 8, cl. 4.
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partnership or the partition of a cotenancy). All of these examples
and many others are governed by how the relevant state law defines
property. In practice, as the Framers envisioned, the vast majority of
property law today is state law.35
The respective roles of federal and state laws in defining the
vertical dimension of property rights—the relationship between
governments and private actors—are less clear. There is no body of
general federal property law. Thus, the vertical dimension is largely
the province of specialized bodies of law other than property law, such
as constitutional law, criminal law, or tax law.36 The definition of
property is important in the application of these doctrines, but they
are not viewed as property law.
Certainly, the Framers were concerned that the federal
government might interfere with state-created property rights. In this
light, the property-related provisions of the Bill of Rights can be seen
as attempts to restrict such interference—largely in reaction to the
British government’s infringement of colonial property rights before
American independence.37 For example, the Second Amendment bars
the federal government from infringing the right to “keep and bear
Arms,”38 while the Third Amendment prohibits it from interfering
with the right to use real property by quartering troops “in any
house.”39 More broadly, the Fifth Amendment restricts the federal
government from depriving an owner of property absent due process,
a “public use” for the property, and payment of “just compensation.”40

35. See, e.g., JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, PROPERTY (5th ed. 2016); WILLIAM STOEBUCK &
DALE WHITMAN, LAW OF PROPERTY (3d ed. 2000).
36. See, e.g., Drye v. United States, 538 U.S. 49, 58 (1999) (“We look initially to state law
to determine what rights the taxpayer has in the property the Government seeks to reach, then
to federal law to determine whether the taxpayer’s state-delineated rights qualify as ‘property’
or ‘rights to property’ within the compass of the federal tax lien legislation.”).
37. For an analysis of the property-related provisions of the Bill of Rights, see BERNARD
H. SIEGAN, PROPERTY RIGHTS: FROM MAGNA CARTA TO THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
102–20 (2001).
38. U.S. CONST. amend. II. The Framers were aware that James II had attempted to
expand the Catholic influence in England by seizing weapons from Protestants in the mid-1600s;
the 1689 English Declaration of Rights, which expressly protected the right to bear arms in
response to these seizures, was the forerunner of the Second Amendment. See District of
Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 593 (2008).
39. U.S. CONST. amend. III. The British violated the traditional property rights of
American owners by quartering troops in private homes, one of the abuses chronicled in the
Declaration of Independence; this experience prompted adoption of the Third Amendment. See
Thomas G. Sprankling, Note, Does Three Equal Five? Reading the Takings Clause in Light of
the Third Amendment’s Protection of Houses, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 112, 124–29 (2012).
40. U.S. CONST. amend. V, §§ 2, 3.
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Even in applying these constitutional protections, however, federal
courts usually defer to state law in defining the scope of property.41
More recently, particularly with the rise of the modern regulatory
state after World War II, actions taken by the federal government
have increasingly affected state-created property rights.42 In
particular, federal statutes adopted under the authority of the
Commerce Clause that primarily deal with subjects other than
property sometimes affect property rights. For example, federal
environmental statutes constrain—and in some situations effectively
nullify—property rights arising under state law, primarily in the
interest of protecting public health or endangered species.43
Further—and directly related to this Article—federal criminal
statutes governing activities linked to interstate commerce also affect
state-created property rights. Federal law classifies certain things as
contraband per se: objects that are “intrinsically illegal in character,”44
“the possession of which, without more, constitutes a crime.”45 An
object is considered to be contraband per se “if there is no legal
purpose to which the object could be put.”46 Marijuana is classified as
contraband per se under federal law.47 The classification of an object
as contraband per se directly affects property rights, particularly in the
context of forfeiture to the government.48 In general, property rights
cannot exist in contraband per se. Accordingly, the federal
41. See Thomas W. Merrill, The Landscape of Constitutional Property, 86 VA. L. REV. 885
(2000) (discussing the definition of “property” for purposes of the Constitution).
42. See generally JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE GUARDIAN OF EVERY OTHER RIGHT: A
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF PROPERTY RIGHTS 142–71 (3d ed. 2008) (discussing the modern
regulatory state’s effect on property rights).
43. For example, the Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531–44 (2012), may
effectively bar the development of certain private lands. See, e.g., Babbitt v. Sweet Home
Chapter of Cmtys. for a Greater Or., 515 U.S. 687 (1995) (upholding regulation issued pursuant
to Endangered Species Act that prevented logging of certain old growth forests).
44. One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693, 700 (1965).
45. Id. at 699.
46. United States v. Harrell, 530 F.3d 1051, 1057 (9th Cir. 2008).
47. See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 27 (2005) (“The CSA designates marijuana as
contraband for any purpose.”) (emphasis in original). See also Schmidt v. County of Nevada,
No. 2:10-CV-3022FCD/EFB, 2011 WL 2967786, at *6 (E.D. Cal. July 19, 2011) (holding that the
plaintiff had no “property interest” in marijuana because it is “undisputably [sic] illegal and
contraband per se”).
48. Although marijuana is contraband per se, it is still considered to be “property” for the
limited purpose of prosecuting property crimes such as robbery or theft. See, e.g., Taylor v.
Phillips, No. 05-CV-2596, 2016 WL 5678582, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2016) (marijuana is
property for the purposes of establishing a Hobbs Act robbery); State v. Turner, 2017 Iowa
App. LEXIS 339, at *9–10 (Iowa Ct. App. Apr. 5, 2017) (“We agree contraband may be
considered property when prosecuting criminal offenses such as robbery and theft.”).
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government may seize such contraband at any time without infringing
the possessor’s rights under the Constitution. In this context, the Fifth
Circuit concluded in Cooper v. City of Greenwood that “one cannot
have a property right in that which is not subject to legal
possession.”49
The counterpart to contraband per se is derivative contraband:
“items which are not inherently unlawful but which may become
unlawful because of the use to which they are put—for example, an
automobile used in a bank robbery.”50 Because a property interest in
such an item “is not extinguished automatically if the item is put to
unlawful use, forfeiture of such an item is permitted only as
authorized by statute” consistent with due process.51
II. STATE V. FEDERAL GOVERNMENT: RECOGNIZING MARIJUANA
PROPERTY
A. The Property-Nonproperty Boundary
For decades, federal and state laws uniformly criminalized the
possession or transfer of marijuana.52 It was deemed to be contraband
per se in which property rights could not exist. As a result, it could be
confiscated at any time by federal or state officials without
compensation. But the modern legalization of marijuana by most
states challenges this approach. Today either property rights cannot
exist in marijuana at all, or such rights can exist under the laws of
legalization states but not under federal law or the laws of ban states.
Millions of Americans use marijuana for medical treatment or
recreation. And the legalization wave has produced tens of thousands
of new marijuana businesses, including growers, manufacturers,
processors, and retailers.53 These businesses all routinely possess large

49. 904 F.2d 302, 305 (5th Cir. 1990). See also Bacon v. United States, No. 2-13-CV-392,
2014 WL 12531093, at *2 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 22, 2014) (“A person may not claim a property
interest in property he has no legal right to possess because the possession of the property is
illegal.”).
50. Cooper, 904 F.2d at 305.
51. Id. See also United States v. 37.29 Pounds of Semi-Precious Stones, 7 F.3d 480, 485 (6th
Cir. 1993).
52. See infra text accompanying notes 61–70, 75. See generally MARK K. OSBECK &
HOWARD BROMBERG, MARIJUANA LAW IN A NUTSHELL 71–87 (2017) (discussing federal and
states laws that criminalize the possession and transfer of marijuana). However, “marijuana was
legal to grow and consume” in all states until the early twentieth century, when some
jurisdictions began to criminalize it. Chemerinsky et al., supra note 4, at 81.
53. Marijuana stores and dispensaries in full legalization states commonly sell both
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quantities of marijuana.54 For example, California growers alone
produce 13.5 million pounds of marijuana each year.55 Without
legally-protected property rights in marijuana, these businesses could
not exist—and millions of Americans would be deprived of the legal
ability to obtain marijuana.
Consider hypothetical farmer G, who holds a license to cultivate
marijuana in a legalization state. G cannot carry on her business
unless the state recognizes her rights to possess marijuana and to
exclude others from its possession. Otherwise, government officials or
ordinary citizens could seize G’s marijuana without payment.
Similarly, G’s right to sell or otherwise transfer her crop must be
protected. As Richard Posner concludes, “without property rights
there is no incentive” for a farmer to plant and nurture her crop
“because there is no reasonably assured reward” for doing so.56
The legal marijuana industry is premised on the apparent belief
that property rights in marijuana will be protected by law.57 For
example, the industry assumes that: contracts concerning marijuana,
such as insurance policies, leases, loan agreements, and purchase
contracts, will be enforced; marijuana will be viewed as an asset that
corporations, partnerships, trusts, and other entities may legally hold;
courts will provide a remedy against tortious conduct that damages

marijuana itself and various marijuana products. These products may include marijuana
concentrates (e.g., oils and waxes), infusions into other types of products (e.g., lotions, pills, and
shampoos), and edibles. John Campbell & Sahib Singh, Budding Torts: Forecasting Emerging
Tort Liability in the Cannabis Industry, 30 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 338, 346–48 (2018).
Examples of edibles include “rice crispy treats, lollipops, lemonade, butter, cookies, cooking
oils, agave nectar, caramels, and even bacon cheddar biscuits.” Mystica M. Alexander &
William P. Wiggins, The Lure of Tax Revenue from Recreational Marijuana: At What Price?, 15
U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 131, 159 (2015).
54. A single store or dispensary may sell thousands of pounds of marijuana per year. See,
e.g., Susan K. Livio, 2017 was banner year for medical marijuana, STAR-LEDGER, May 23, 2018,
2018 WLNR 15375272 (noting that one New Jersey dispensary sold 2,302 pounds in 2017).
Further, one farm can produce tens of thousands of pounds of marijuana per year. See, e.g.,
Daniel Smithson, New medical pot protections praised by industry advocate, ORLANDO
SENTINEL, Apr. 2, 2018, 2018 WLNR 9886420 (describing a Florida facility that will produce
27,000 pounds per year).
55. Pushing pot back into the shadows with high taxes, ORANGE CNTY. REGISTER, Nov.
11, 2017, https://www.ocregister.com/2017/11/11/pushing-marijuana-back-into-the-shadows-withhigh-taxes/.
56. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 40 (9th ed. 2014).
57. It is axiomatic that every business in a market economy relies on enforcement of
property rights. See, e.g., Barry R. Weingast, Capitalism, Democracy, and Countermajoritarian
Institutions, 23 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 255, 256–57 (2015).
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marijuana; and investments in marijuana and marijuana-related
businesses will be respected.58
Yet, as discussed below, the question of marijuana ownership is a
conundrum. Under the American tradition that state law defines
property rights, marijuana can be owned under state law in
legalization states.59 Thus, state law prohibits third parties or the state
itself from illegally interfering with farmer G’s marijuana. But under
federal law, marijuana is contraband per se that cannot be owned.60 As
a result, federal authorities may seize G’s marijuana at any time
without judicial process or payment of compensation. The result is a
legal paradox: G owns marijuana (under state law) but does not own
marijuana (under federal law).
B. Federal Law: The Controlled Substances Act
Federal regulation of marijuana is based on the Controlled
Substances Act of 1970 (CSA), a comprehensive public health statute
that covers hundreds of drugs.61 Today, many authorities believe that
marijuana poses little or no risk to human health and in fact has
substantial medical value.62 However, it is still classified as a Schedule
I drug, meaning that it “has a high potential for abuse,” it “has no
currently accepted medical use,” and “[t]here is a lack of accepted
safety for use of the drug . . . under medical supervision.”63 Examples
of other Schedule I drugs include ecstasy,64 heroin,65 and LSD.66
58. Yet under the federal Controlled Substances Act, the federal government is
empowered to seize marijuana as contraband per se, without judicial process or payment of
compensation. See infra text accompanying notes 61–71. Thus, marijuana businesses and their
customers face the risk that their marijuana, which is legal under state law, may nonetheless be
forfeited to the federal government. However, to date, the federal government has generally not
exercised this authority in connection with sales that are legal under state law. See infra text
accompanying notes 128–37. Presumably, the participants in the legal marijuana industry
believe that the federal government will continue this policy.
59. See infra text accompanying notes 77–86.
60. See infra text accompanying notes 67–74.
61. 21 U.S.C. §§ 801–904 (2012). The CSA uses the term “marihuana,” which is defined as
“all parts of the plant Cannabis sativa L.,” its seeds, its resin, “and every compound,
manufacture, salt, derivative, mixture, or preparation of such plant, its seeds or resin,” with
limited exceptions such as stalks or fibers. 21 U.S.C § 802(16) (2012). This definition accordingly
includes products that contain marijuana or its active ingredient, tetrahydrocannabinol.
62. See OSBECK & BROMBERG, supra note 52, at 404–14 (summarizing research on health
effects).
63. 21 U.S.C. § 812(c), Sched. I(c)(10) (2012). There is widespread agreement that
marijuana is not as dangerous as other drugs listed in Schedule I. For example, in United States
v. Kiefer, 477 F.2d 349, 356 (2d Cir. 1973), the Second Circuit noted that “[i]t is apparently true
that there is little or no basis for concluding that marihuana is as dangerous a substance as some
of the other drugs included in Schedule I.” Yet in United States v. Pickard, 100 F. Supp. 3d 981,
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The CSA imposes criminal penalties for the possession or transfer
of any Schedule I drug, including marijuana. Section 844 provides that
it is “unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally to possess a
controlled substance” such as marijuana, regardless of the amount
involved or the purpose for the possession. The penalty for a first
offense is imprisonment for up to a year and/or a fine of at least
$1,000.67 Further, under section 841 it is unlawful for anyone to either
“possess” marijuana “with intent . . . to distribute” it or to “distribute”
it, regardless of amount.68 In this context, “distribute” means “to
deliver (other than by administering or dispensing) a controlled
substance.”69 This language is broad enough to encompass any
intentional transfer of marijuana by one person to another, whether
by gift, sale, or otherwise. The penalty for distributing 1,000 kilograms
of marijuana is imprisonment for ten years or longer and/or a fine of
up to $50 million.70
Since the mere possession or transfer of marijuana is illegal under
the CSA, the argument logically follows that marijuana is contraband
per se that cannot be the subject of property rights under federal law.
Indeed, this is the conventional view. As a federal court explained in
Schmidt v. County of Nevada, “[u]nder the federal Controlled
Substances Act . . . it is illegal for any private person to possess
marijuana . . . [and, accordingly] under federal law marijuana is
contraband per se, which means that no person can have a cognizable
legal interest in it.”71
This result is consistent with the traditional view that property
consists of legal rights in relation to a particular thing. As shown
1009 (E.D. Cal. 2015), the court refused to find that “its placement on Schedule I is so arbitrary
or unreasonable as to render it unconstitutional.” There is evidence that long-term marijuana
use can cause adverse health effects. See GERALD F. UELMEN & ALEX KREIT, 1 DRUG ABUSE
AND THE LAW SOURCEBOOK § 3:75, Dec. 2017 Update.
64. 21 U.S.C. § 812(c)(1) (2012).
65. Id. § 812(b)(10).
66. Id. § 812(c)(9).
67. Id. § 844(a).
68. Id. § 841(a)(1).
69. Id. § 802(11).
70. Id. § 841(b)(1)(A)(vii).
71. No. 2:10-CV-3022FCD/EFB, 2011 WL 2967786, at *5 (E.D. Cal. July 19, 2011). See
also Barrios v. Cnty. of Tulare, No. 1:13:CV-1665, 2014 WL 2174746, at *5 (E.D. Cal. May 23,
2014) (“Because marijuana is contraband under federal law, Barrios had no property interest in
the marijuana that was protected by the Fourteenth Amendment due process clause.”). The
Supreme Court has never addressed the issue of property rights in marijuana, though it has held
that Congress was empowered to adopt the CSA pursuant to the Commerce Clause. Gonzales v.
Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 9 (2005).
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above, the CSA expressly precludes the rights to possess or transfer
marijuana. In practice, it also eliminates the rights to use and exclude.
It is impossible for anyone to use a tangible object that cannot be
possessed. Similarly, a person who has no right to possess such an
object cannot protect her possession against intrusions by third
parties. Because the CSA abrogates all the core rights in the
metaphorical bundle, it effectively prohibits ownership of marijuana.
Moreover, an independent basis for finding that federal law bars
property rights in marijuana is arguably found in section 881(a) of the
CSA, its civil forfeiture provision.72 This section provides that “[a]ll
controlled substances which have been . . . distributed . . . or acquired
in violation of this subchapter” and “[a]ll controlled substances which
have been possessed in violation of this subchapter” “shall be subject
to forfeiture to the United States and no property right shall exist in
them . . . .”73 In Mazin v. True, a federal court quoted this provision and
concluded that “marijuana is contraband per se under federal law,
which expressly disavows any property right in such contraband.”74
Accordingly, the federal government is empowered to seize marijuana
from anyone who possesses it as a matter of federal law.
In summary, there are compelling arguments that marijuana
cannot be owned—at least for the purposes of federal law. Yet this
analysis does not resolve the separate question of whether property
rights can exist in marijuana as a matter of state law.
C. State Law: The Legalization Tidal Wave
Like federal law, state laws imposed criminal penalties for the
possession or transfer of marijuana for decades.75 Under this
72. However, the better interpretation of the italicized language in § 881(a) is that it
applies only after a forfeiture occurs. CSA § 881(h) provides that “[a]ll right, title, and interest in
property described in subsection (a) of this section shall vest in the United States upon
commission of the act giving rise to forfeiture in this section.” 21 U.S.C. § 881(h) (2012)
(emphasis added). Thus, the effect of the forfeiture process is to transfer existing property rights
from an owner to the federal government. It is important to note that the items listed in
subsection (a) include both contraband per se and derivative contraband. In context, the
references to “property” in § 881(a) and (h) can only refer to derivative contraband, because
forfeiture of such property (and thus transfer of property rights) occurs only when an illegal
“act” is committed. Because property rights can never exist in contraband per se under federal
law, the possessor has no “right, title, or interest” to transfer.
73. 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(1), (8) (2012) (emphasis added).
74. No. 1:14-CV-00654-REB-CBS, 2015 WL 1228321, at *2 (D. Colo. Mar. 16, 2015).
75. All fifty states eventually adopted statutes similar to the CSA, largely based on the
Uniform Controlled Substances Act of 1970 (hereinafter “UNIFORM CSA”). UNIF.
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES ACT 9 Part V U.L.A. 853, 860 (2007). As a result, the possession or
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approach, marijuana was contraband per se in which property rights
could not exist. But in recent years, most states have abandoned this
absolutist position by adopting statutes that legalize the possession
and transfer of marijuana under certain circumstances. These statutes
do not expressly address the broader issue of marijuana ownership;
nor has any court directly ruled on the question. However, analyzed in
light of background principles of property law, these statutes support
the view that marijuana can be owned—to some extent—as a matter
of state law.76
Led by Colorado and Washington, ten states have legalized
marijuana for all purposes—subject to various restrictions—and have
thus sanctioned its possession and transfer.77 For example, Colorado’s
voter-approved amendment to the state constitution authorizes the
cultivation, possession, purchase, transfer, transport, and use of
marijuana.78 Similarly, the successful voter initiative in Washington
provides that the possession of marijuana by an adult and the
production, delivery, distribution, sale, or possession of marijuana by
state-approved businesses are permitted under state law.79
Broadly speaking, the legalization statutes in these states make a
distinction between marijuana businesses and marijuana users. Under
strict regulation, businesses are permitted to grow, possess, and

distribution of marijuana became illegal in all states.
76. A number of states that prohibit the possession or transfer of marijuana for any
purpose do permit the possession and sale of cannabidiol, a non-psychoactive substance that is
derived from the cannabis plant. See OSBECK & BROMBERG, supra note 52, at 219. Cannabidiol
would seemingly be classed as a “derivative” of cannabis, and thus fall within the definition of
“marihuana” under the CSA. 21 U.S.C. § 802(16) (2012). However, the U.S. Food and Drug
Administration has approved the use of cannabidiol for the treatment of seizures related to
certain types of epilepsy. Press Release, U.S. Food and Drug Administration, FDA approves
first drug comprised of an active ingredient derived from marijuana to treat rare, severe forms of
epilepsy, June 25, 2018, https://www.fda.gov/newsevents/newsroom/pressannouncements/
ucm611046.htm.
77. Alaska, California, Colorado, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Nevada, Oregon,
Vermont, and Washington have legalized recreational use of marijuana. Jeremy Berke & Skye
Gould, States where marijuana is legal, BUS. INSIDER, Mar. 26, 2019,
https://www.businessinsider.com/legal-marijuana-states-2018-1.
78. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN., CONST. art. XVIII, § 16(3) (West 2017). For example,
“possessing, using, displaying, purchasing, or transporting . . . one ounce or less of marijuana” is
lawful. Id. But see People v. Crouse, 388 P.3d 39 (Colo. 2017) (holding that section of state’s
medical marijuana law which required officers to return seized marijuana to patient was
preempted by the CSA); Joel S. Neckers & Joel M. Pratt, The Marijuana Industry after Crouse:
Is the Glass Half Empty or Half Full?, 47 COLO. LAW. 27, 29 (Jan. 2018) (warning that under
Crouse “even an accusation of wrongdoing that leads to a cannabis seizure could mean the end
of a business”).
79. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 69.50.360, 69.50.363, 69.50.366 (West 2017).

SPRANKLING_MACROS (DO NOT DELETE)

2019]

OWNING MARIJUANA

5/15/2019 8:10 PM

17

process large quantities of marijuana, and to sell small quantities.
Marijuana users are authorized to possess and use small quantities in
these states, and may grow a limited number of marijuana plants. For
example, in California it is lawful for a person to possess up to 28.5
grams of marijuana and to cultivate up to six marijuana plants.80
Further, twenty-three states have legalized marijuana for the
limited purpose of medical treatment.81 Although their approaches
differ to some extent, they share the same basic pattern: closelyregulated businesses may cultivate, process, possess, and sell large
quantities of marijuana; patients with a doctor’s prescription may
purchase and possess small quantities and also grow a few marijuana
plants. For example, North Dakota authorizes residents to “process or
sell, possess, transport, dispense, or use marijuana” for medical
purposes under limited circumstances.82 A “manufacturing facility”
can possess up to 1,000 plants, while a “dispensary” can have up to
3,500 ounces of marijuana.83 A qualifying patient may purchase up to
2.5 ounces of marijuana from a dispensary over a 30-day period, and
may possess up to 3 ounces during this time.84
These legalization statutes are based on the belief that marijuana
is relatively harmless, and indeed can be an effective medical
treatment for some patients. Viewed from this perspective, marijuana
should not be listed as a Schedule I drug—unlike other Schedule I
drugs that are clearly harmful such as heroin and LSD. Under this
approach, marijuana is seen as far less dangerous than other things
that are considered to be contraband per se under federal law.
The legalization wave has a profound impact on marijuana
ownership. Although no statute or case directly addresses the issue, it
now seems clear that marijuana may be owned in most states as a
matter of state law. With the repeal of state statutes that criminalized
marijuana, the traditional principle that property rights may exist in
any thing now applies. Further, the state legalization statutes
effectively recognize the core elements that constitute the traditional
bundle of rights: the rights to possess, use, transfer, and exclude. These
statutes expressly validate the rights to possess and transfer marijuana

80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.1(a) (1), (3) (West 2017).
Berke & Gould, supra note 77.
N.D. CENT. CODE § 19-24.1-02 (2017).
Id. § 19-24.1-24.
Id. § 19-24.1-01(2).
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under certain circumstances.85 The legalization of possession, in turn,
effectively recognizes the rights to use and exclude. Prior state law
eliminated the right to use only indirectly; because marijuana could
not be possessed, it could not be used. Further, given legal recognition
of the right to possess, it logically follows that state law will protect
this right by preventing third parties from interfering with that
possession, thus recognizing the owner’s right to exclude. In sum,
because a person may now hold the core property rights in marijuana,
marijuana property exists under state law.86
This historic transition affects both the horizontal and vertical
dimensions of property rights. Under state law, each legalization state
will respect marijuana ownership in disputes among private actors to
at least some extent87 and will refrain from seizing legally-owned
marijuana from private actors.88
D. Resolving the Federal-State Conflict
1. Joint Sovereignty in Context
Our hypothetical marijuana farmer G holds property rights in her
crop under state law. But under federal law, she has no property rights
in the crop—and federal officials may confiscate it at any time. These
inconsistent approaches to marijuana property raise the question of
preemption.
The Supremacy Clause of the Constitution provides that the
“Laws of the United States . . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land;
and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the
. . . Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.”89 It arguably

85. See supra notes 77–84. Moreover, statutes in some legalization states provide that
citizens are entitled to the return of marijuana that they legally possess when it is illegally seized
by law enforcement authorities. See, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 26-2B-4(G) (2007); OR. REV.
STAT. § 475B.922(2) (2018).
86. Because all legalization states still restrict marijuana to some extent, however, the
scope of marijuana property is limited. For example, because a legal marijuana user in
California can possess only up to 28.5 grams, a person who possesses 100 grams does not hold
property rights in the additional 71.5 grams. See supra note 80.
87. Cf. Muridan v. Redl, 413 P.3d 1072, 1081–82 (Wash. Ct. App. 2018) (affirming trial
court’s determination that proceeds from the sale of marijuana equipment constituted
community-like property and were thus subject to “equitable property division” upon the
termination of a couple’s relationship).
88. See, e.g., Oregon v. Ellis, 316 P.3d 412 (Or. Ct. App. 2013) (holding trial court erred in
denying defendant’s motion to return “usable marijuana” after police seized it during
defendant’s arrest for driving while intoxicated since he held a medical marijuana card).
89. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
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follows that even states which have legalized marijuana—and, more
to the point, judges in these states—should follow the federal view
that marijuana property cannot exist.
But both federal and state governments possess “elements of
sovereignty the other is bound to respect.”90 As the Supreme Court
has explained, the states retain “substantial sovereign authority under
our constitutional system.”91 One traditional area of state sovereignty
is the state’s right to determine what constitutes property within its
borders, as discussed in Part I above. Accordingly, federal law will not
supersede the state law definition of property absent either express
preemption or implied preemption. However, the CSA probably does
not preempt the state laws that effectively recognize marijuana
property.
2. Preemption Is Unlikely
Express preemption exists when Congress clearly states that
federal law will supersede state law.92 Implied preemption occurs in
three situations: (1) field preemption, where “Congress . . . has
determined [that the field of law] must be regulated by its exclusive
governance;”93 (2) conflict preemption, where “compliance with both
federal and state regulations is a physical impossibility;”94 and (3)
conflict preemption, where the state law “stands as an obstacle to the
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of
Congress.”95
In applying these principles, courts use a presumption against
preemption. As the Supreme Court observed in Medtronic, Inc. v.
Lohr, in preemption cases, “particularly those in which Congress has
‘legislated in a field which the states have traditionally occupied,’ we
‘start with the assumption that the historic police powers of the States
were not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the
clear and manifest purpose of Congress.’”96 Because property rights
are created under state law, this presumption applies with particular

90. Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 398 (2012).
91. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 457 (1991).
92. Mich. Canners & Freezers Ass’n, Inc. v. Agric. Mktg. & Bargaining Bd., 467 U.S. 469
(1984).
93. Arizona, 567 U.S. at 399.
94. Id. (quoting Fla. Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142–43 (1963)).
95. Id. (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)).
96. 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996) (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230
(1947) and Hillsborough Cty. v. Automated Med. Labs., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 715–716 (1985)).
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force to the question of whether the CSA supersedes state-created
property rights in marijuana.
The CSA is an example of “cooperative federalism.”97 It was
intended to be part of an integrated system for regulating controlled
substances that federal and state governments would share. Under
this framework, the federal government would take a lead role while
states would have parallel authority under state law.98 Accordingly,
almost all states enacted legislation patterned on the CSA, most
commonly by adopting the Uniform Controlled Substances Act of
1970 (Uniform CSA).99 As its Prefatory Note observes, the Uniform
CSA was “designed to complement the new Federal . . . legislation
and provide an interlocking trellis of Federal and State law to enable
government at all levels to more effectively control the drug abuse
problem.”100 The Uniform CSA largely criminalizes the same conduct
that the CSA covers.101 However, it allows each state to establish its
own schedules of controlled substances as a matter of state law, which
may differ from the federally-regulated substances listed in the CSA
schedules.102
Because federal and state governments have concurrent authority
over controlled substances, Congress took care to minimize the risk of
preemption. CSA section 903 specifies that no provision in the act:
should be construed as indicating an intent on the part of Congress
to occupy the field in which that provision operates, to the
exclusion of any State law on the same subject matter that would
otherwise be within the authority of the State, unless there is a

97. See Chemerinsky et al., supra note 4; Todd Grabarsky, Conflicting Federal and State
Medical Marijuana Policies: A Threat to Cooperative Federalism, 116 W. VA. L. REV. 1 (2013);
Matthew A. Melone, Federal Marijuana Policy: Homage to Federalism in Form; Potemkin
Federalism in Substance, 63 WAYNE L. REV. 2015 (2018).
98. In practice, the federal government “has prosecuted large-scale traffickers and drug
cartels and left prosecution of everyday, street level marijuana activity to the states.” OSBECK &
BROMBERG, supra note 52, at 472.
99. UNIFORM CSA, supra note 75, at 853.
100. Id. at 854.
101. Compare 21 U.S.C. §§ 841, 844(a) (2012) with UNIFORM CSA § 401(a), (c), supra note
75, at 886–87.
102. UNIFORM CSA § 201(a) provides that a designated state agency may “add substances
to or delete or reschedule all substances in the schedules.” UNIFORM CSA, supra note 75, at
866. The Comment to this section explains that “[t]he Uniform Act is not intended to prevent a
State from adding or removing substances from the schedules.” Id. at 868. Thus, the drafters of
the Uniform CSA contemplated that a state could choose not to criminalize the possession or
transfer of a substance such as marijuana under state law.
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positive conflict between that provision of this subchapter and that
State law so that the two cannot consistently stand together.103

There is no serious argument that express preemption applies to
the state laws that effectively recognize marijuana property. An
example of express preemption is found in Jones v. Rath Packing Co.,
where the Supreme Court held that a federal statute concerning meat
packages which provided that “requirements in addition to, or
different than, those made under this Act may not be made by any
State” preempted state law.104 No section of the CSA contains a
similar express provision; in fact, Congress specifically restricted the
preemptive scope of the CSA, as shown in the portion of section 903
quoted above.105 It might be asserted that the phrase in CSA section
881(a)(1) that “no property right shall exist” in marijuana and other
Schedule I substances supports express preemption. But nothing in
that section expressly purports to affect state law.106 Moreover, in
context this language was intended to relate only to the status of
property rights after forfeiture107 to the federal government, not to
property rights before forfeiture.108 Because no provision of the CSA

103. 21 U.S.C. § 903 (2012); see also H.R. REP. NO. 91-1444, 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4629
(explaining that this section bars preemption unless there is a “direct and positive conflict”
between federal and state legislation).
104. 430 U.S. 519, 530–31 (1977).
105. 21 U.S.C. § 903 (2012).
106. The only decision exploring the impact of this language on state-created property
rights is Mazin v. True, No. 1:14-CV-00654-REB-CBS, 2015 WL 1228321 (D. Colo. Mar. 16,
2015). There the court interpreted it to mean that “there is no recognized or protected property
right in marijuana under federal law.” Id. at *2 (emphasis added). In response to the argument
that “state law defines property rights,” the court reasoned that “[t]he plaintiff has no federally
protected property interest in his marijuana even if that marijuana is legal under Colorado law.”
Id. (emphasis added).
107. See supra note 72.
108. The statutory language makes this reasonably clear. The complete introductory phrase
in section 881(a) reads: “The following shall be subject to forfeiture to the United States and no
property right shall exist in them . . . .” (emphasis added). In context, this subsection was not
intended to apply to state-created property rights. Legislative history also supports this
interpretation. The House Report on the CSA explained that this subsection merely “sets forth
the conditions for forfeiture and the property to be forfeited” under federal law. H.R. REP. NO.
91-1444, 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4623. There is no indication that it was also intended to supersede
state law. In fact, the Uniform Controlled Substances Act contains its own provisions that
govern forfeiture under state law. UNIFORM CSA § 505(a), supra note 75. Cf. People v.
Odenwald, 285 P. 406, 408 (Cal. Ct. App. 1930) (observing that nearly-identical language
included in the Volstead Act, which prohibited the possession of liquor, “was clearly intended
solely to protect government officials in the exercise of their duties,” not to eliminate statecreated property rights).
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expressly states that it will supersede state law, there can be no
express preemption.109
Next, as section 903 makes clear, Congress has chosen not to
“occupy the field” of controlled substances regulation.110 Rather, the
CSA contemplates that federal and state governments have shared
authority in this area.111 Therefore, field preemption does not apply to
marijuana property laws.112
The question of conflict preemption based on physical
impossibility is more complex. Most decisions conclude that the CSA
does not preempt state legalization laws as a general matter.113 For
example, the Michigan Supreme Court rejected the defendant city’s
impossibility claim in Ter Beek v. City of Wyoming,114 because the
state’s medical marijuana statute did not require the city to violate the
CSA. A Rhode Island court reached the same conclusion, noting that
nothing in the state law legalizing marijuana “requires the Town—or
anyone—to ‘manufacture, distribute, dispense, or possess’ marijuana
or otherwise violate the CSA.”115 In short, the state laws legalizing
marijuana do not require its cultivation, possession, or transfer by
private actors, but merely permit it. By the same token, the
recognition of marijuana property under state law merely permits
such ownership, without requiring it. Accordingly, compliance with
both federal and state law is not physically impossible. Under this
analysis, federal and state law can “consistently stand together” as
section 903 contemplates.116

109. See White Mountain Health Ctr., Inc. v. Maricopa Cnty., 386 P.3d 416, 426 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 2016) (finding no express preemption under the CSA); R.I. Patient Advocacy Coal.
Found. v. Town of Smithfield, No. PC-2017-2989, 2017 WL 4419055 (R.I. Super. Ct. Sept. 27,
2017).
110. 21 U.S.C. § 903 (2012) (disclaiming any congressional intent to “occupy the field” as a
general matter).
111. Id. See also supra notes 97–103.
112. See White Mountain Health Ctr., Inc., 386 P.3d 416 (finding no field preemption under
the CSA); R.I. Patient Advocacy Coal. Found., 2017 WL 4419055.
113. See Brilmayer, supra note 4 at 902–11 (arguing that the CSA does not preempt state
laws legalizing marijuana); Chemerinsky et al., supra note 4, at 100–13 (same).
114. 846 N.W.2d 531, 544 (Mich. 2014).
115. R.I. Patient Advocacy Coal. Found., 2017 WL 4419055, at *6; see also City of Palm
Springs v. Luna Crest, Inc., 200 Cal. Rptr. 3d 128, 131–33 (Ct. App. 2016) (affirming trial court’s
determination that federal law does not preempt city’s regulation of medical marijuana).
116. Preemption on this basis might arise in the property context under narrow
circumstances. For example, where a state court appoints a receiver in a dispute concerning a
business whose assets include marijuana, the receiver would necessarily take possession of the
marijuana; in this situation, it would be physically impossible to comply with both federal and
state law. Cf. People v. Crouse, 388 P.3d 39, 43 (Colo. 2017) (finding preemption where state
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Similarly, most courts reject preemption arguments based on the
general assertion that state marijuana legalization laws pose an
obstacle to the federal approach.117 As the Arizona Supreme Court
stated in Reed-Kaliher v. Hoggatt, “[a] state law stands as an obstacle
to a federal law ‘[i]f the purpose of the [federal law] cannot otherwise
be accomplished . . . .’”118 The court reasoned that the “state-law
immunity” created by Arizona’s medical marijuana law did not
“frustrate the CSA’s goal of conquering drug abuse or controlling
drug traffic . . . [because] the people of Arizona ‘chose to part ways
with Congress only regarding the scope of acceptable medical use of
marijuana.’”119 Moreover, as another court explained, its state law
legalizing marijuana “does not (and could not) deny the federal
government the ability to enforce the CSA, and does not (and could
not) immunize medical marijuana users from prosecution.”120 In the
same manner, state recognition of marijuana property is not an
obstacle to enforcement of the CSA by the federal government.121 The
federal government is free to enforce the CSA within legalization
states if it chooses to do so, even though these states recognize
marijuana property under state law.
In short, the state laws that effectively recognize marijuana
property are not preempted under any of the four tests. If there were
any doubt about this outcome, the strong presumption against
superseding state laws that govern property—a field traditionally
occupied by the states—would tip the balance against preemption.

law required police officers to return marijuana to acquitted medical marijuana patient because
this was an illegal distribution of a controlled substance under federal law). But see City of
Garden Grove v. Superior Court, 68 Cal. Rptr. 3d 656, 677–78 (Ct. App. 2008).
117. See also Chemerinsky, supra note 4, at 111 (arguing that state legalization laws are
consistent with the purposes and objectives of the CSA).
118. 347 P.3d 136, 141 (Ariz. 2015) (quoting Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530
U.S. 363, 373 (2000)).
119. Id. (quoting Ter Beek v. City of Wyoming, 846 N.W.2d 531, 539 (Mich. 2014)).
120. R.I. Patient Advocacy Coal. Found., 2017 WL 4419055, at *7. See also City of Palm
Springs, 200 Cal. Rptr. 3d 128, 131–33 (finding no obstacle preemption).
121. However, some courts have found conflict preemption to parts of state legalization
laws in specific circumstances. See, e.g., People v. Crouse, 388 P.3d 39, 41–43 (Colo. 2017)
(finding preemption of law that required police officers to return marijuana to acquitted
medical marijuana patient, because such return was a distribution of a controlled substance);
Emerald Steel Fabricators, Inc. v. BOLI, 230 P.3d 518, 536 (Or. 2010) (finding limited
preemption because state’s issuance of medical marijuana card to patient affirmatively
authorized use of marijuana).
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3. Federalism Policies and Preemption
Ultimately, the preemption doctrine seeks to preserve the
constitutional balance between federal and state governments. The
normative justifications that underpin our federal system further
support the conclusion that state laws recognizing marijuana property
are not preempted. The preemption question will almost certainly be
resolved by state courts,122 not federal courts, and accordingly state
judges should consider these policies in the decision process.
As the Supreme Court explained in Gregory v. Ashcroft, the joint
sovereign structure of federalism provides important benefits:
It assures a decentralized government that will be more sensitive
to the diverse needs of a heterogenous society; it increases
opportunity for citizen involvement in democratic processes; it
allows for more innovation and experimentation in government;
and it makes government more responsive by putting the States in
competition for a mobile citizenry.123

These policy goals are best served by finding that state laws
recognizing marijuana property are not preempted.124
First, recognition of marijuana property both addresses the
diverse needs of our society and allows for experimentation in
government. It accommodates the wishes of the millions of Americans
who use marijuana in states that have chosen legalization. Further, it
allows the states, as proverbial laboratories of democracy, to test the
value of marijuana legalization.
A court considering preemption cannot ignore the legal
environment in which the question arises. The ongoing tension
between the federal government and legalization states over
marijuana is akin to an unstable détente.125 While maintaining that
122. In most states, decisions by lower federal courts are merely persuasive authority, not
binding precedent. See Amanda Frost, Inferiority Complex: Should State Courts Follow Lower
Federal Court Precedent on the Meaning of Federal Law?, 68 VAND. L. REV. 53, 62 (2015).
Therefore, even if federal courts of appeal and district courts have previously ruled on the
question of preemption, state courts are entitled to decide the issue based on their own
interpretation of the law.
123. 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991).
124. These federalism justifications endorsed by the Gregory Court were based on Michael
W. McConnell, Federalism: Evaluating the Founders’ Design, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1484, 1491–
1511 (1987) and Deborah Jones Merritt, The Guarantee Clause and State Autonomy: Federalism
for a Third Century, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 3–10 (1988). Gregory, 501 U.S. at 458. See also David
Schleicher, Federalism and State Democracy, 95 TEX. L. REV. 763, 783 (2017) (listing additional
justifications).
125. See, e.g., Green Earth Wellness Ctr., LLC v. Atain Specialty Ins. Co., 163 F. Supp. 3d
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state legalization statutes are invalid under the Supremacy Clause as a
theoretical matter, the federal government has diplomatically chosen
to tolerate the status quo for years except in extreme situations126—
and, accordingly, has tacitly accepted that marijuana property can
exist under state law.127 By its inaction, the federal government has
acknowledged that legalization both responds to the diverse needs of
our society and allows for potentially helpful experimentation.
For the last ten years, federal interest in enforcing the marijuana
ban in legalization states has been tepid at best.128 In a series of
memoranda issued between 2009 and 2013 during the Obama
administration, including the “Cole memorandum,” the Department
of Justice gradually deprioritized federal enforcement in states that
legalized marijuana as long as certain federal policy priorities were
respected.129 Because the state programs did not infringe these
priorities, the memoranda effectively acquiesced to state
legalization.130 Moreover, in 2014 Congress adopted the Rohrabacher821, 832–33 (D. Colo. 2016) (observing that “the nominal federal prohibition against possession
of marijuana conceals a far more nuanced (and perhaps even erratic) expression of federal
Policy” given public statements by federal officials “that reflected an ambivalence toward
enforcement of the Controlled Substances Act where a person or entity’s possession and
distribution of marijuana was consistent with well-regulated state law”); Green Cross Med., Inc.
v. Gally, 395 P.3d 302, 308–09 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2017) (refusing to invalidate a contract on the
basis that it facilitated the illegal possession, use, and sale of marijuana, in part because of “the
federal government’s lack of interest” in prosecuting people who comply with the state’s
medical marijuana law).
126. See infra text accompanying notes 128–37 (discussing federal responses to state
legalization statutes).
127. Even within legalization states, however, federal law governs activities that occur on
federal lands such as national parks, national forests, military installations, and lands governed
by the Bureau of Land Management. See infra text accompanying notes 166–68.
128. The federal government has focused its anti-marijuana enforcement efforts on “largescale traffickers and drug cartels.” OSBECK & BROMBERG, supra note 52, at 472. Given the
limits imposed on marijuana possession and transfer by legalization states, it is highly unlikely
that these state laws would shield such traffickers or cartels.
129. See Memorandum from David W. Ogden, Deputy Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to
all U.S. Attys, Investigations and Prosecutions in States Authorizing the Medical Use of
Marijuana (Oct. 19, 2009), https://www.justice.gov/opa/blog/memorandum-selected-united-stateattorneys-investigations-and-prosecutions-states; Memorandum from James M. Cole, Deputy
Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to all U.S. Attorneys, Guidance Regarding the Ogden Memo
in Jurisdictions Seeking to Authorize Marijuana for Medical Use (June 29, 2011),
http://files.ctctcdn.com/201bc6cf001/10f50403-6ee6-4e47-bbc3-ed48d1912bbb.pdf; Memorandum
from James M. Cole, Deputy Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to all U.S. Attorneys, Marijuana
Enforcement (Aug. 29, 2013) (hereafter “Cole Memorandum”), http://files.ctctcdn.com/
201bc6cf001/10f50403-6ee6-4e47-bbc3-ed48d1912bbb.pdf.
130. The eight federal priorities were to prevent the distribution of marijuana to minors;
prevent revenue from marijuana sales from going to criminals; prevent diversion of marijuana to
states where it was illegal; prevent marijuana activity from being used as a pretext for other
illegal activity; prevent violence in the cultivation and distribution of marijuana; prevent adverse
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Farr Amendment to an omnibus spending bill, which prohibited the
Department of Justice from using federal funds to prevent the
implementation of state laws legalizing medical marijuana.131 In
United States v. McIntosh, the Ninth Circuit concluded that this
amendment not only barred direct action against such states, but also
precluded federal prosecution of medical marijuana growers and
retailers whose activities complied with state law.132
This lack of enforcement has continued under the Trump
administration. On the one hand, former Attorney General Jefferson
Sessions issued a new memorandum essentially rescinding the
Obama-era approach.133 Yet Congress extended the financial ban on
medical marijuana prosecution in a 2018 spending bill, which
President Trump signed.134 Further, during the current administration
“there have apparently been no federal raids or seizures at pot
companies for sales that are legal under state law”—and thus in
practice the Obama-era policy is still being followed.135 Most recently,
current Attorney General William Barr expressly revived part of this
policy by indicating that the Department of Justice will not “go after
companies that have relied on the Cole memorandum.”136 Indeed,
President Trump has expressed tentative support for federal
legislation that would respect state legalization laws.137

public health consequences associated with marijuana; prevent the growing of marijuana on
public lands; and prevent marijuana possession or use on federal property. See Cole
Memorandum, supra note 129.
131. Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2015, Pub. L. No. 113-235,
§ 538, 128 Stat 1230, 2217 (2014).
132. 833 F.3d 1163, 1177 (9th Cir. 2016).
133. Memorandum from Jefferson B. Sessions, Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to all U.S.
Attorneys, Marijuana Enforcement (Jan. 4, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pressrelease/file/1022196/download.
134. Trump Signs Spending Bill That Included Medical Marijuana Protections, MARIJUANA
BUS. DAILY, Mar. 23, 2018, https://mjbizdaily.com/trump-signs-spending-bill-includes-medicalmarijuana-protections/.
135. Evan Halper, Trump inclined to back ending pot ban, L.A. TIMES, June 9, 2018, 2018
WLNR 17754974. The same article quotes John Vardaman, a former Department of Justice
attorney who participated in creating the Obama-era approach, as saying: “Remarkably little, if
anything, has changed. Almost every U.S. attorney in states where marijuana is legal has
decided to apply the same principles.” Id. On an overall basis, “[t]here have been dramatic
declines in marijuana arrests in states that have legalized.” Tamar Todd, The Benefits of
Marijuana Legalization and Regulation, 23 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 99, 106 (2018).
136. Kyle Jaeger, Trump Attorney General Nominee Won’t Go After Legal Marijuana
Businesses, MARIJUANA MOMENT, Jan. 15, 2019, https://www.marijuanamoment.net/trumpattorney-general-nominee-pledges-not-to-go-after-legal-marijuana-businesses/.
137. Halper, supra note 135 (quoting President Trump as saying that he would
“probably . . . end up supporting” a proposed bill allowing states to legalize marijuana).
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Second, legalization of marijuana—and the concomitant
recognition of marijuana property—reflects citizen involvement in the
political process. In many states, legalization occurred as a direct
result of voter initiatives, while in others it stemmed from public
pressure on legislators. Moreover, the arc of history is moving toward
nationwide legalization at some point in the future. For example, a
recent survey shows that 93% of Americans support the legalization
of marijuana for medical purposes—including overwhelming
majorities of Republican, Democratic, and independent voters.138
Today 63% of Americans favor national legalization for all purposes,
and this percentage will probably increase over time with
demographic transition because support is strongest among those
under 65 years old.139
Finally, honoring property rights in marijuana makes government
more responsive to citizen needs, thus creating competition among the
states for a mobile citizenry. As noted above, legal marijuana is the
fastest-growing industry in the United States.140 Businesses involved in
growing, processing, and selling marijuana are premised on the
existence of state laws that will protect their property rights. Third
parties that do business with marijuana businesses—such as insurers,
landlords, and lenders—similarly rely on the continued success of
those entities, and hence on the existence of marijuana property.
Consistent with our tradition of federalism, each state should be
allowed to determine whether it will recognize marijuana property,
and thus attract citizens from other states.
It is axiomatic that property rights comprise the foundation of
every market economy. As intended by the Framers, this foundation is
governed by state law. Thus, each state government is essentially
administering its own property law system and must use a definition
of property that is stable and functional in order to respond to societal
needs. For example, state laws govern on-going business relationships
involving property, including financing, insurance, investments, leases,
sales, and other relationships. State courts must divide property
138. Quinnipiac University Poll, Support for Marijuana Hits New High, Apr. 16, 2018,
https://poll.qu.edu/national/release-detail?ReleaseID=2539. Legalization of medical marijuana
is supported by 86% of Republicans, 97% of Democrats, and 95% of independent voters. Id.
139. Support for national legalization of marijuana is closely tied to demographics. Among
Americans between 18 and 34 years old, 82% favor it; in the 35–49 year age group, support is at
70%; in the 50-64 year age group, it is at 63%. Id. In contrast, 52% of those 65 and over oppose
legalization. Id.
140. See supra note 7.
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among co-owners in many situations, such as divorce,141 intestate
succession, partition, and partnership dissolution. Further, state law
provides remedies when property-related disputes occur, such as tort
or contract claims. Having legalized marijuana under state law, state
governments cannot turn their backs on the property rights they have
created—and their decisions to create such rights in response to
citizen needs are entitled to deference by the federal government.
E. Challenges Posed by the Hybrid System
1. Toward the Hybrid System
In sum, the CSA does not preempt state laws legalizing
marijuana142 and, accordingly, the state laws that effectively recognize
marijuana property have full force and effect. The time has come to
acknowledge that this conflict creates a hybrid property system:
marijuana property exists under state law but not federal law. As a
result, the executive, judicial, and legislative branches of each
legalization state will respect and protect property rights in marijuana
even though their federal counterparts will not.
For example, in City of Garden Grove v. Superior Court,143 a
California appellate court ordered that marijuana seized by police
during a traffic stop be returned to the driver, who held a physician’s
approval to use marijuana for medical reasons. Acknowledging that
the driver’s “marijuana possession was legal under state law, but
illegal under federal law,”144 the court reasoned that the Controlled
Substances Act did not preempt the California law on point. It
accordingly held that “due process and fundamental fairness”
required the return of the marijuana,145 consistent with “the principles
of federalism embodied in the United States Constitution.”146
Recognition of the hybrid system is a first step toward mitigating
the tension between the federal and state approaches. Once this
practical reality is accepted, courts and scholars can begin charting the
141. Cf. Muridan v. Redl, 413 P.3d 1072, 1081–82 (Wash. Ct. App. 2018) (affirming trial
court’s determination that proceeds from the sale of marijuana equipment constituted
community-like property and were thus subject to “equitable property division” upon the
termination of a couple’s relationship).
142. See also OSBECK & BROMBERG, supra note 52, at 146–52.
143. 68 Cal. Rptr. 3d 656, 680 (Ct. App. 2008).
144. Id. at 670.
145. Id. at 680. But see Barrios v. Cnty. of Tulare, No. 1:13-CV-1665AWI/GSA, 2014 WL
2174746, at *7 (E.D. Cal. May 23, 2014) (contra).
146. City of Garden Grove, 68 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 682.

SPRANKLING_MACROS (DO NOT DELETE)

2019]

5/15/2019 8:10 PM

OWNING MARIJUANA

29

legal terrain governed by each approach, and marijuana owners can
structure their affairs to best protect their property rights.
2. Judicial Recognition of the System
The outline of the hybrid system can already be discerned in a
handful of cases. No decision has expressly held that state law
authorizes marijuana ownership despite conflicting federal law. But
some courts have implicitly embraced this approach in cases dealing
with property rights related to marijuana.147
The hybrid approach is reflected in certain decisions dealing with
the vertical dimension of property rights. An example is Schmidt v.
County of Nevada,148 where a federal district court rejected the
plaintiff’s claim under the Constitution for damages following the
destruction of his marijuana, even though his right to possession was
protected by California’s medical marijuana law. It reasoned that
“plaintiff cannot recover damages as a result of the confiscation or
destruction of marijuana because he had no cognizable property
interest in the marijuana. Plaintiff asserts a due process claim under
the federal Constitution in federal court where, under federal law,
marijuana is undisputably [sic] illegal and contraband per se.”149 As a
later federal court summarized in Little v. Gore:
[E]ven though “state law creates a property interest, not all statecreated rights rise to the level of a constitutionally protected
interest.” With respect to medical marijuana, although California
state law may create a property interest in the marijuana,
California district [that is, federal] courts have found there is no
protected interest for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment.150
147. See, e.g., Barrios, 2014 WL 2174746, at *5 (“Although California may provide Barrios
with the right to possess medical marijuana, federal law does not. Because marijuana is
contraband under federal law, Barrios had no property interest that was protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment due process clause.”); Mazin v. True, No. 1:14-CV-00654-REB-CBS,
2015 WL 1228321, at *2 (D. Colo. Mar. 16, 2015) (“The plaintiff argues that state law defines
property rights and consideration of overlaying federal law is of no consequence when resolving
his claims under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. As a matter of law, this position is
incorrect. ‘Although the underlying substantive interest is created by an independent source
such as state law, federal constitutional law determines whether that interest rises to the level of
a legitimate claim of entitlement protected by the Due Process Clause.’” (quoting Town of
Castlerock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 757 (2005)).
148. No. 2:10-CV-3022FCD/EFB, 2011 WL 2967786, at *7 (E.D. Cal. July 19, 2011).
149. Id. at *6 (emphasis added).
150. 148 F. Supp. 3d 936, 955 (S.D. Cal. 2015) (quoting Brady v. Gebbie, 859 F.2d 1543,
1548 n. 3 (9th Cir. 1988)) (emphasis added). See also River North Props., LLC v. City of Denver,
No. 13-CV-01410-CMA-CBS, 2014 WL 7437048, at *5 (D. Colo. Dec. 30, 2014), (granting
motion to dismiss plaintiff’s claims on the basis that plaintiff had not pleaded a “cognizable
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In contrast, the California appellate court in City of Garden Grove v.
Superior Court mandated that local police return marijuana to the
owner following its seizure because the “marijuana possession was
legally sanctioned under state law.”151
Moreover, a few decisions implicitly utilize the hybrid approach in
the horizontal dimension, recognizing the existence of marijuana
property in litigation among private actors. For example, in Green
Earth Wellness Center v. Atain Specialty Insurance Co., a commercial
marijuana grower sued its insurance company for compensation after
smoke and ash damaged marijuana plants.152 The policy provisions
covered damage to “Business Personal Property.”153 The federal
district court denied the insurance company’s motion for summary
judgment, reasoning that (1) “Property” as defined in the policy could
include marijuana plants and (2) the policy exclusion for
“Contraband” was “rendered ambiguous by the difference between
the federal government’s de jure and de facto public policies regarding
state-regulated medical marijuana.”154
Similarly, in Green Cross Medical, Inc. v. Gally, an Arizona
appellate court refused to invalidate a lease between a landowner and
a state-licensed medical marijuana dispensary operator on the theory
that it was an illegal contract because it facilitated “possession, use, or
sale of marijuana” in violation of the CSA.155 In reaching this
conclusion, the court emphasized “the federal government’s lack of
interest in prosecuting individuals in compliance with [the state’s
medical marijuana law], as well as a public policy that favors
enforcement of the lease compliant with state law.”156
3. Contours of the System
Under the hybrid system, property rights in marijuana located
within the borders of a legalization state should be treated like any
other form of property under state law—no better and no worse.
Assume again that farmer G grows marijuana in a legalization state in
a manner that complies with state law. Her property rights should be
recognized and enforced by the courts of that state in both the
property interest” in the cultivation of marijuana under the federal Constitution).
151. City of Garden Grove, 68 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 680 (emphasis added).
152. 163 F. Supp. 3d 821, 823 (D. Colo. 2016).
153. Id. at 827.
154. Id. at 833.
155. 395 P.3d 302, 306 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2017).
156. Id. at 308.
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horizontal and vertical dimensions, including the following sample
situations.157
Parties to business transactions in legalization states should be
entitled to rely on state law to protect their marijuana property. For
example, the law should recognize the authority of attorneys-in-fact,
conservators, corporate officers, guardians, partners, trustees,158 and
others to hypothecate, lease, sell, or otherwise transfer such property.
Similarly, parties to contracts that relate to marijuana property must
be entitled to rely on the validity of such contracts under state law,
without concern that such a contract might be held invalid as illegal or
against public policy.159 And state courts should adjudicate disputes
concerning title to marijuana.
Property rights in marijuana should also be respected in
legalization states in situations where property is to be divided among
co-owners. Thus, in divorce proceedings, marijuana property should be
deemed to be community property for allocation in community
property states160 and marital property subject to equitable
distribution in separate property states. For example, if H divorces I in
a separate property state that has legalized marijuana, marijuana
owned by H should be subject to equitable distribution. Similarly,
courts should treat marijuana property like any other type of property
when distributing assets pursuant to a will, trust, or intestate
succession. Further, courts should allocate marijuana property like

157. Similarly, the owner of marijuana property will be subject to all liabilities that are
generally imposed on property. For example, creditors should be able to levy on such property
to satisfy judgments.
158. Cf. Green Cross Med., Inc. v. Gally, 395 P.3d 302, 303 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2017) (trustee
leased trust property to tenant for use as medical marijuana dispensary).
159. Even certain federal courts have refused to invalidate marijuana-related contracts on
this basis. See, e.g., Green Earth Wellness Ctr., LLC v. Atain Specialty Ins. Co., 163 F. Supp. 3d
821, 834–35 (D. Colo. 2016) (insurance policy); Mann v. Gullickson, No. 15-CV-03630-MEJ,
2016 WL 6473215, at *7–9 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 2, 2016) (promissory note). Cf. Kinetic Dev. LLC v.
Sky Unlimited LLC, No. 17-CV-0562-WJM-MLC, 2017 WL 6523512 (D. Colo. Nov. 22, 2017)
(granting motion to remand case involving real estate purchase contract to state court on basis
that no federal question existed, despite contingency in contract that buyer obtain a license to
sell marijuana on the property). See also Green Cross Med., Inc., 395 P.3d 302, 309 (refusing to
invalidate lease). But see Haeberle v. Lowden, No. 2011CV709, 2012 WL 7149098, at *5 (Colo.
Dist. Ct. Aug. 8, 2012) (refusing to enforce contract for sale of marijuana). See also Luke M.
Scheuer, Are “Legal” Marijuana Contracts “Illegal”?, 16 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 31 (2015).
160. Cf. Muridan v. Redl, 413 P.3d 1072, 1081–82 (Wash. Ct. App. 2018) (affirming trial
court’s determination that proceeds from the sale of marijuana equipment constituted
community-like property and were thus subject to “equitable property division” upon the
termination of a couple’s relationship).
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any other asset when dissolving a corporation, partnership, or other
business entity, or partitioning cotenancy property.
Finally, state courts should provide the owner of marijuana
property with the normal remedies that any owner has against
tortious actions of third parties that injure property. For instance, if J
negligently burns K’s marijuana, K should be entitled to recover
damages from J. Similarly, marijuana property should be recognized in
the context of other tort actions, such as conversion and trespass.
However, under the hybrid system marijuana property is not
recognized under federal law and thus receives no federal protection.
Thus, in the vertical dimension, there is a risk that federal authorities
may seize marijuana from a farmer like G in a legalization state, with
no obligation to pay compensation or otherwise respect her property
rights under state law. Given the federal government’s anemic
enforcement efforts in recent years, however, this risk may be more
theoretical than real.
A more direct consequence of the hybrid system is that marijuana
owners are deprived of access to federal courts and agencies in any
matter relating to the vertical dimension of property rights. For
example, despite lackluster enforcement of the federal criminal laws
governing marijuana, federal courts actively continue to treat
marijuana as contraband per se in civil litigation governed by federal
laws that involve the vertical dimension—such as banking law,
constitutional law, environmental law, and tax law.161
Finally, the system also affects the horizontal dimension of
property rights under federal law to some degree. For example, farmer
G could not file for bankruptcy because a federal court cannot
administer assets that include marijuana without violating the CSA.162
Nor could she obtain a federal trademark for her marijuana or
marijuana products.163

161. See supra notes 148–50.
162. See, e.g., In re Arenas, 514 B.R. 887, 891 (D. Colo. 2014) (dismissing bankruptcy action
filed by marijuana growers because its administration would involve “the Court and the Trustee
in the Debtors’ ongoing criminal violation of the CSA”); In re McGinnis, 453 B.R. 770, 772–73
(D. Or. 2011) (refusing confirmation of reorganization plan that involved sale and cultivation of
marijuana).
163. Cf. In re Morgan Brown, 110 U.S.P.Q.2d 1350 (T.T.A.B. 2016) (denying federal
registration of trademark for store that would sell marijuana).
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4. Reflections on the System
The concept that marijuana property can exist within the territory
of a particular state under state law—but not under federal law—is
fraught with legal and geographical complexity. This schism will
inevitably cause confusion and generate litigation.
For example, the extent to which federal courts will recognize
marijuana ownership in situations governed by state law, if at all,
remains hazy. It is conceivable that a federal court in a legalization
state might defer to state law on the point when adjudicating a state
law claim,164 such as a diversity action stemming from intentional
destruction of a marijuana crop.165 Until this uncertainty is resolved,
there is a significant risk that litigants will take strategic advantage of
the hybrid system in forum shopping or removal proceedings. A
marijuana owner in a legalization state will presumably avoid filing
actions in federal court, given the danger that the court will not honor
her property rights. Conversely, a party to a dispute with a marijuana
owner may file a preemptive lawsuit in federal court with the hope
that the choice of forum will effectively prohibit the owner from
obtaining relief. Similarly, where a marijuana property owner sues in
state court, the defendant may seek to remove the action to federal
court—solely to benefit from the federal view that marijuana
property cannot exist.
In situations where state and federal courts have concurrent
jurisdiction—for example, a claim against a city arising under both the
federal Due Process Clause and a parallel clause in the state
constitution—presumably a state court in a legalization jurisdiction
would recognize marijuana property, even though a federal court
would not do so in the same setting. Yet this outcome is by no means
certain.
Individuals and businesses involved in transactions relating to
marijuana property can minimize the risks inherent in the hybrid
system by utilizing contract clauses that mandate arbitration,
mediation, or other forms of alternative dispute resolution. Where the
selected method requires application of law, the contract should
contain a choice of law clause that selects the law of the legalization
164. Cf. Green Earth Wellness Ctr., LLC, 163 F. Supp. 3d 821, 827–28 (treating marijuana
plants as covered property under an insurance policy).
165. Just as marijuana is generally considered to be “property” for the purposes of property
crimes such as theft, the same policy concern against intentional misconduct should extend to
intentional torts that cause damage. See supra note 48.
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state to govern disputes. Even if the parties to a transaction prefer not
to use alternative dispute resolution, their contract should at least
include such a choice of law clause.
The hybrid system also produces geographical uncertainty. The
Constitution provides that Congress has broad power to enact
legislation governing activities on lands owned by the federal
government.166 Thus, even within a legalization state, federal law will
govern activities on public lands within that state that are owned by
the federal government.167 These include lands controlled by the
National Park Service, the Forest Service, the Bureau of Land
Management, the Department of Defense, and other federal agencies.
In fact, the federal government owns huge tracts of land in states that
have legalized marijuana. For example, federal lands comprise 45.8%
of California and 35.9% of Colorado.168 As a practical matter, it may
be difficult for individuals and entities to know where marijuana
property is legally recognized, even within legalization states. As an
illustration, lands managed by the Bureau of Land Management are
frequently leased to private parties for grazing or mineral extraction;
the boundaries between these lands (subject to federal law) and
adjacent private-owned parcels (subject to state law) may not be
marked.
In sum, the hybrid system effectively creates two inconsistent sets
of rules for marijuana property within a legalization state. Marijuana
property can exist under state law—except on lands owned by the
federal government. At the same time, under federal law, marijuana
property will not be recognized by federal courts under most
circumstances, nor will it be honored by other branches of the federal
government.
III. STATE V. STATE: THE MARIJUANA PROPERTY CONUNDRUM
A. Interstate Conflicts
Marijuana property conflicts can also arise in the interstate
context.169 Unsurprisingly, the categories of tangible things in which

166. See U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 17.
167. Id. art IV, § 3, cl. 2.
168. Daniel Johnson & Pratheek Rebala, Here’s Where the Federal Government Owns the
Most Land, TIME, Jan. 5, 2016, http://time.com/4167983/federal-government-land-oregon/.
169. This Part assumes that the CSA does not preempt state legalization statutes, for the
reasons discussed in Part II.
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property rights may exist vary somewhat among states. For example,
some states permit private ownership of certain animals (e.g., lions)170
or drugs (e.g., peyote),171 while others do not.172 Historically, litigation
involving conflicts between such state laws has been rare. But given
the size and growth rate of the legal marijuana industry—and the
sharp disagreement among state laws governing marijuana—it is
inevitable that interstate conflicts will occur.
Many states still follow the view that the possession or transfer of
marijuana is a criminal offense. For instance, Idaho classifies
marijuana as a Schedule I substance under its controlled substances
law.173 It is unlawful for any person to cultivate, transfer, or possess
marijuana in Idaho,174 and any such marijuana is “subject to
forfeiture.”175 Thus, marijuana is contraband per se in the state and,
accordingly, property rights cannot exist in marijuana located within
its borders.176
Consider an example of a potential interstate conflict. Suppose L
and M are married in a separate property state that recognizes
marijuana property. L operates a legal business that sells recreational
marijuana in that state; M later moves to another separate property
state that does not recognize marijuana property, where he establishes
a new domicile and files for divorce. Will the forum state treat L’s
marijuana property as “property” for purposes of equitable
distribution and accordingly award a share to M?

170. See Born Free USA, Summary of State Laws Relating to Private Possession of Exotic
Animals, http://www.bornfreeusa.org/b4a2_exotic_animals_summary.php (last updated May
2016) (listing state laws on ownership of exotic animals).
171. See David Bogen & Leslie F. Goldstein, Culture, Religion and Indigenous People, 69
MD. L. REV. 48, 61–62 (2009) (discussing the exemption of religious use of peyote from federal
drug laws and most state drug laws). Although peyote is a Schedule I drug under the CSA, there
is a regulatory exception for its use in religious ceremonies. 21 C.F.R. § 1307.31 (2018).
172. For example, Connecticut and Kentucky prohibit private ownership of lions, with
special exceptions for zoos and other research institutions. See Born Free USA, supra note 170.
See also Bogen & Goldstein, supra note 171, at 61–62 (noting that some states did not allow the
use of peyote for any purpose before the American Indian Religious Freedom Act
Amendments of 1994 were passed).
173. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 37-2705(d)(19) (West 2018) (listing the substance as
“marihuana”).
174. Id. § 37-2732(a) provides that “it is unlawful for any person to manufacture or
deliver . . . a controlled substance.” The term “manufacture” includes “propagation” or growing,
while the term “deliver” is defined as “the actual, constructive, or attempted transfer from one
(1) person to another of a controlled substance.” Id. § 37-2701(g), (s). Further, “[i]t is unlawful
for any person to possess a controlled substance.” Id. § 37-2732(c).
175. Id. § 37-2744(a)(1).
176. See supra text accompanying notes 71–72.
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The same issue can arise between a full legalization state and a
medical marijuana state. Applying this variant to the L-M
hypothetical above, would the forum state that has only legalized
medical marijuana award M any share in L’s recreational marijuana
property?177
The common theme in these examples is that litigation arises from
a relationship that involves two states: the state where the legal
marijuana is located and the forum state that has a more restrictive
approach.178 It is unlikely that interstate conflicts would arise between
two states that share the same legalization approach, either two full
legalization states or two medical marijuana states. Similarly, such
interstate disputes will not occur between two ban states because
neither would recognize marijuana property.
This interstate conflict concern applies with equal force to many
other situations involving property rights, including: the authority of
attorneys-in-fact, conservators, corporate officers, guardians, partners,
trustees, and others to hypothecate, lease, sell, or otherwise transfer
marijuana property; the validity of contracts for these purposes;
disputes concerning title to marijuana; distribution of marijuana
property pursuant to a will, trust, or intestate succession; dissolution
of corporations, partnerships, and other business entities that own
marijuana property; partition of cotenancies owning marijuana
property; and tort actions stemming from injury to marijuana.
These situations all present a choice-of-law question: Will the
forum state utilize its own law or the law of the legalization state?179
Regrettably, modern choice-of-law theory is in “considerable
disarray,” while “[t]he disarray in the courts may be worse” because a
number of approaches are currently in use.180 At bottom, however,

177. Another variant situation is a conflict between a ban state and a Native American tribe
that legalizes marijuana on its reservation in that state. See OSBECK & BROMBERG, supra note
52, at 166–71.
178. See, e.g., Ginsburg v. ICC Holdings, No. 3:16:CV-2311-D, 2017 WL 5467688, at *8
(N.D. Tex. Nov. 13, 2017) (refusing to dismiss breach of contract claim relating to defendants’
medical marijuana business where contract selected Illinois law, which authorized medical
marijuana, but suit was brought in Texas because “defendants fail to cite any authority in
support of their apparent position that, under federal and Texas law, a contract with the
purpose of funding an organization that is violating or intends to violate federal law is
automatically void or unenforceable”).
179. This analysis assumes that federal law does not preempt marijuana legalization
statutes, as discussed in Part II.D above.
180. WILLIAM M. RICHMAN ET AL., UNDERSTANDING CONFLICT OF LAWS 285 (4th ed.
2013).
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interstate disputes related to marijuana property present two basic
choice-of-law variants. First, where the applicable choice-of-law rule
directs the forum state to use the law of the legalization state, should
the forum state refuse to do so based on its own public policy?
Second, where the applicable rule permits the forum state to use its
own law, should it instead use the law of the legalization state as a
matter of comity?
B. Legalization State v. Ban State
1. Situs Law and Public Policy
In most relevant situations, the applicable choice-of-law rule will
direct the forum state to use the law of the legalization state—thereby
recognizing marijuana property. The forum state should not refuse to
do so based on a public policy objection.181
As a general rule, ownership interests in a tangible thing are
determined by the law of the state that “has the most significant
relationship to the thing and the parties” in litigation.182 The
Restatement (Second) of Conflicts of Law provides that seven
principles should be used in making this determination: (a) “the needs
of the interstate or international system;” (b) “the relevant policies of
the forum;” (c) “the relevant policies of other interested states and
the relative interests of other states in the determination of the
particular issue;” (d) “the protection of justified expectations;” (e)
“the basic policies underlying the particular field of law;” (f)
“certainty, predictability and uniformity of result”; and (g) “ease in
the determination and application of the law to be applied.”183 This
analysis usually results in the forum state using the law of the state
where the particular thing is located. Thus, a leading treatise
concludes that “[s]itus law is likely to be most appropriately
concerned with goods within the confines of the state.”184 Under the
Restatement approach, the law of the legalization state will usually
181. Of course, a litigant may choose not to raise such an objection for strategic reasons.
The plaintiff who brings a divorce action in a ban state against a spouse who operates a
marijuana business in a legalization state, for example, would benefit from avoiding use of the
forum state law.
182. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS OF LAW § 222 (AM. LAW INST. 1971).
183. Id. § 6
184. PETER HAY ET AL., CONFLICT OF LAWS 1217 (6th ed. 2018). Cf. Itar-Tass Russian
News Agency v. Russian Kurier, Inc., 153 F.3d 82, 84 (2d Cir. 1998) (holding that Russian law
determined ownership of a copyright, but that United States law determined whether the
copyright was infringed in the United States).
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have the most significant relationship to the marijuana and the parties
to the dispute, and thus will normally govern, particularly because the
marijuana is physically located outside of the forum state’s territory.185
In addition, choice-of-law rules will direct the forum state to use
the law of the legalization state in a number of specific situations. For
example, the validity and effect of a contract for the sale of goods—
including marijuana—is typically governed by the choice-of-law
clause in the contract. Given the risk of interstate conflicts, prudent
contracting parties will insert a clause selecting the law of the
legalization state to govern disputes.186 Similarly, the validity of
security interests in personal property are governed by the law of the
state where the debtor resides, which in the context of marijuana
property litigation would usually be a legalization state.187 A parallel
rule applies to divorce proceedings, where interests in personal
property are usually determined by the law of the marital domicile
when the asset is acquired.188 Another example is a tort action
concerning injury to tangible personal property, which is governed by
the law of the state where the injury occurs.189
However, it is well settled that the forum state may utilize its law
when the use of another state’s law would violate its own public
policy.190 As the Supreme Court noted in Baker v. General Motors
Corporation, “[t]he Full Faith and Credit Clause does not compel ‘a
state to substitute the statutes of other states for its own statutes
dealing with a subject matter concerning which it is competent to
legislate.’”191 Moreover, the Court explained, “[a] court may be guided
by the forum State’s ‘public policy’ in determining the law applicable
to a controversy.”192

185. The conflict between federal law and state law in legalization states arises because
both the federal government and the relevant state government share sovereign authority over
the territory where the marijuana is located. In the context of the interstate conflicts, however,
the forum state has no sovereignty over the territory where the marijuana is located and,
accordingly, lacks substantial justification for utilizing its own law.
186. U.C.C. § 1-301(a) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017).
187. Id. § 9-301(1).
188. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS OF LAW § 258(2) (AM. LAW INST. 1971).
189. Id. § 147.
190. Unfortunately, “‘[p]ublic policy,’ as every law student well knows . . . is all too often
employed as a talisman to avoid reasoning on the underlying issues.” RICHMAN, supra note 180,
at 185.
191. 522 U.S. 222, 232 (1998) (quoting Pac. Emp’rs Ins. Co. v. Indus. Accident Comm’n, 306
U.S. 493, 501 (1939)).
192. Id. at 233 (citing Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 421–24 (1979)).
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Yet the parties to a consensual transaction relating to marijuana
property—as in the contract examples above—can minimize the risk
of a successful public policy objection by using a choice-of-law clause
that selects the law of the particular legalization state.193 Where the
parties have utilized such a clause, the scope of the exception is
narrow; the clause must be enforced unless the “chosen state has no
substantial relationship to the parties or the transaction” or
application of the chosen law would be “contrary to a fundamental
policy of a state which has a materially greater interest in the
determination of the particular issue.”194 It would be difficult to argue
successfully that this exception applies to a transaction in a
legalization state that involves marijuana property. In this situation,
the forum state has no relationship to the transaction and no
substantial relation to any parties based in a legalization state.
Further, the legalization state would have the “greater interest” in
applying its own public policy in favor of marijuana property.
The public policy exception applies with somewhat greater force
where no choice-of-law clause is involved—for example, in the
divorce and tort illustrations discussed above. Restatement (Second)
of Conflicts of Law § 90 provides that “[n]o action will be entertained
on a foreign cause of action the enforcement of which is contrary to
the strong public policy of the forum.”195 But the Comments to this
section specify that “[a]ctions should rarely be dismissed because of
the rule of this Section,” quoting Justice Cardozo’s conclusion that
such a dismissal should not occur unless failure to do so “would
violate some fundamental principle of justice, some prevalent
conception of morals, some deep-seated tradition of the
commonwealth.”196
A state law that criminalizes the possession or transfer of
marijuana clearly embodies a public policy against such conduct.
However, in a marijuana property dispute it is unlikely to qualify as a
strong public policy. First, although a ban state may have a legitimate
interest in enforcing this policy against conduct within its own
193. Cf. Ginsburg v. ICC Holdings, No. 3:16:CV-2311-D, 2017 WL 5467688, at *5 (N.D.
Tex. Nov. 13, 2017) (parties to a contract relating to a medical marijuana business selected
Illinois law, which recognized medical marijuana, to govern but suit was brought in Texas, which
did not).
194. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS OF LAW § 187(2)(a), (b) (AM. LAW INST.
1971).
195. Id. § 90.
196. Id. cmt. c (quoting Loucks v. Standard Oil Co. of N.Y., 120 N.E. 198, 202 (N.Y. 1918)).
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territory, it has little or no interest in doing so when the conduct
occurs outside of its borders. Second, given the federal government’s
anemic enforcement of the CSA, some federal courts have rejected
public policy attacks in cases relating to marijuana property197—and
the forum state may have similar misgivings. Finally, application of the
marijuana ban policy might conflict with a more important policy of
the forum state on the facts of the particular case. For instance, in a
divorce action, a spouse domiciled in a legalization state might argue
that her marijuana property should not be deemed “property” for
purposes of equitable distribution given the forum’s public policy—
but this would disadvantage the spouse domiciled in the forum state,
and thus conflict with the policy of allowing a resident spouse to
receive a fair share of marital assets.198 In sum, a public policy
objection to the use of a legalization state’s law is unlikely to be
successful.199
Finally, even if a public policy objection were otherwise
appropriate, its use might violate the Due Process Clause. The
Supreme Court explained in Allstate Insurance Co. v. Hague that “if a
State has only an insignificant contact with the parties and the
occurrence or transaction, application of its law is unconstitutional.”200
An example is John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Yates,
where a New York resident purchased an insurance policy from a

197. See, e.g., Green Earth Wellness Ctr., LLC v. Atain Specialty Ins. Co., 163 F. Supp. 3d
821, 835 (D. Colo. 2016); Mann v. Gullickson, No. 15-CV-03630-MEJ, 2016 WL 6473215, at *5
(N.D. Cal. Nov. 2, 2016).
198. Alternatively, suppose that a resident of a ban state intentionally destroys marijuana in
a legalization state, and the owner then sues for damages in the ban state. Applying the antimarijuana policy on these facts would conflict with the forum state’s own presumed public
policy against allowing a person to intentionally injure property owned by another. Even ban
states will prosecute a person who steals marijuana from its possessor because this conduct
conflicts with the public policy against theft. See supra note 48.
199. In contrast, a ban state is clearly required to enforce a judgment issued by a
legalization state that relates to marijuana property, despite a public policy concern. Under the
Full Faith and Credit Clause of the Constitution, each state is obligated to respect the “judicial
Proceedings” of other states. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1. There is no public policy exception to this
rule. See Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 U.S. 230, 239 (1908) (White, J., dissenting) (“The court now
reverses on the ground that the due faith and credit clause obliged the courts of Mississippi, in
consequence of the action of the Mississippi court, to give efficacy to transactions in Mississippi
which were criminal, and which were against the public policy of that state.”); see also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS OF LAW § 117 (AM. LAW INST. 1971) (stating that
such a judgment must be enforced “even though the strong public policy of the [forum] State
would have precluded recovery in its courts on the original claim”).
200. 449 U.S. 302, 310–11 (1981) (plurality opinion); see also Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281
U.S. 397, 410 (1930) (noting that the forum state’s choice of law “may not abrogate the rights of
parties beyond its borders having no relation to anything done or to be done within them”).
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Massachusetts corporation, and the insured’s widow later moved to
Georgia where she brought suit on the policy under Georgia law.201
On these facts, the Court held that application of Georgia law was
unconstitutional due to the state’s de minimis connection.202 Similarly,
if two parties enter into a contract related to marijuana property in a
legalization state, without a choice-of-law clause, and one later moves
to a ban state where he is sued for breach of contract, this contact
would probably be too minor to allow the use of the ban state’s law.
2. Forum Law and Comity
In some situations, a choice-of-law rule will authorize the forum
state to use its own law in cases involving marijuana—most commonly
in connection with the division or distribution of property. For
example, the law of the testator’s domicile at death usually
determines whether a will transfers any legal interest in tangible
personal property such as marijuana,203 and also governs rights to
such property that pass through intestate succession.204 Similarly,
forum law normally governs the dissolution of a corporation
incorporated in that state, including the distribution of its property.205
Yet a ban state’s mechanical use of its own law in such a situation
produces a troublesome result: the court will not recognize marijuana
property located in a legalization state as “property” and hence will
not distribute it to the putative owners. As a result, title to such assets
will be either appropriated by adverse possession206 or escheat to the
legalization state.207 Either outcome will injure residents of the ban
state and unjustly enrich residents of the legalization state.
Under these circumstances, the ban state might use the
legalization state’s law as a matter of comity—not because this is

201. 299 U.S. 178, 179 (1936).
202. Id. at 182–83.
203. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS OF LAW § 263(1) (AM. LAW INST. 1971); see
also Shaw Family Archives Ltd. v. CMG Worldwide, Inc., 486 F. Supp. 2d 309, 313–16 (S.D.N.Y.
2007) (holding that law of domicile at death determined whether testatrix held a right of
publicity that could be devised). However, a testator can avoid the risk that a ban state might
invalidate a devise of rights in marijuana property by including a choice-of-law clause in the will
that directs the use of the law of a legalization state. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS
OF LAW § 264(1) (AM. LAW INST. 1971) (providing that a will that devises “an interest in
movables is construed in accordance with the local law of the state designated for this purpose
in the will”).
204. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS OF LAW § 260 (AM. LAW INST. 1971).
205. HAY, supra note 184, at 1355.
206. See SPRANKLING, supra note 11, at § 7.02.
207. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. § 1410 (West 2007).
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required by choice-of-law rules, but rather because the court
determines that it is appropriate under the circumstances.208 While
observing that attorneys who do not specialize in conflict of laws may
“find the field mystifying, frustrating, and a bit silly,” Larry Kramer
suggests a number of canons that courts could adopt to clarify the
subject.209 Two of those canons might be used in cases involving
marijuana property: one based on obsolescence, the other on reliance.
First, Kramer argues that “[w]here one of two conflicting laws is
obsolete (i.e., inconsistent with prevailing legal and social norms in
the state that enacted it), the other law should be applied.”210 A state
statute that criminalizes marijuana possession and transfer is likely to
be inconsistent with social norms even in a ban state because
marijuana use is increasingly accepted. Further, even in such a state,
the statute is unlikely to be enforced with vigor.
Second, he suggests that “[w]here two laws conflict, but the parties
actually and reasonably relied on one of them, that law should be
applied.”211 In many situations involving marijuana property, the
parties will have relied on the belief that such property located in a
legalization state would be judicially protected. For example, the
partners who invest in marijuana assets or the testator who devises
such property presumably all share the same good faith belief that
their ownership rights will be respected.
C. Full Legalization State v. Medical Marijuana State
The choice-of-law issues discussed above may also arise in
litigation involving a full legalization state and a medical marijuana
state because the scope of their respective laws will differ. For
instance, assume that N and O are married in a separate property
state that has legalized marijuana for all purposes. O establishes a
farm that legally grows marijuana for recreational use, and N then
moves to a state that only permits marijuana cultivation under tightly
controlled circumstances and restricts marijuana use to medical
purposes. When N files for divorce, will the forum state recognize O’s

208. See generally Joseph William Singer, Multistate Justice: Better Law, Comity, and
Fairness in the Conflict of Laws, 2015 U. ILL. L. REV. 1923 (discussing the role of comity in
conflict of laws).
209. Larry Kramer, Rethinking Choice of Law, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 277, 344 (1990).
210. Id. at 334–35.
211. Id. at 336–37.
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marijuana property as “property” for purposes of the divorce if it was
grown in a manner that violates the forum state’s law?
Where the applicable choice-of-law rule directs the forum state to
use the legalization state’s law, it seems quite unlikely that a public
policy objection would succeed. Both states would share the same
view that marijuana property should be recognized as a general
matter, even though they disagree on the parameters of ownership.
Such disagreement can hardly be viewed as a convincing public policy
objection. A helpful analogy is found in Intercontinental Hotels
Corporation v. Golden, where the plaintiff brought suit in New York
to enforce I.O.U.s given by the defendant in payment of gambling
debts legally incurred at a casino in Puerto Rico.212 Although
gambling was generally illegal under New York law, the court refused
to reject the use of Puerto Rico law on public policy grounds, noting
that the legalization of limited forms of gambling in New York—
”pari-mutuel betting and the operation of bingo games”—indicated
that “the New York public does not consider authorized gambling” to
violate public policy.213 Similarly, the partial acceptance of legalized
marijuana by a medical marijuana state indicates that it does not have
a strong public policy against marijuana as a general matter.
Similarly, where the forum state is authorized to use its own law,
the argument that it should defer to the legalization state’s law as a
matter of comity is strong. Kramer’s obsolescence canon applies with
even greater force to a medical marijuana state, since such a state
already recognizes marijuana property to some extent. The reliance
canon is also helpful in a medical marijuana state when one or more
of the affected parties have relied on the law in a legalization state in
entering into a contract or other relationship concerning marijuana
located in such a state.
IV. THE FUTURE OF MARIJUANA PROPERTY
A. End of Marijuana Détente?
The legalization wave shows no signs of abating. Given the
overwhelming popular support for medical marijuana, it is likely that
additional states will adopt this position in the future. Moreover,

212. 203 N.E.2d 210, 211 (N.Y. 1964).
213. Id. at 213.
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campaigns are in progress in a number of states to legalize
recreational marijuana.214
The current marijuana détente between the federal government
and legalization states may ultimately be ended by aggressive federal
enforcement of the CSA. But the more likely outcome is that the
status quo will continue into the foreseeable future—as it has for
many years. The possibility of future legalization should not
overshadow the importance of grappling with the federal-state and
interstate conflicts discussed above. Eventually, however, some form
of new federal legislation may endorse the legalization effort, either
by sanctioning marijuana on a nationwide basis or by allowing each
state to decide the issue for itself. Under either approach, there is a
risk that marijuana property will not be fully protected.
B. Impact of Nationwide Legalization
Because most Americans now favor national legalization, in the
long run the current impasse is likely to be resolved by federal
legislation that legalizes the possession and transfer of marijuana for
all purposes throughout the United States.215 Congress clearly has the
power to adopt such legislation under its authority to regulate
interstate commerce. In Gonzales v. Raich, the Supreme Court
rejected the claim that the CSA’s “prohibition of the manufacture and
possession of marijuana as applied to the intrastate manufacture and
possession of marijuana for medical purposes” was not authorized by
the Commerce Clause.216 It stressed that Congress was empowered to
“regulate purely local activities” that have a substantial effect on
interstate commerce, which includes the cultivation “for home
consumption, of a fungible commodity for which there is an
established, albeit illegal, interstate market.”217 Under this logic, the
legalization of marijuana cultivation, distribution, and possession

214. These states include Connecticut, Illinois, and New Jersey. See Christopher Keating,
Marijuana taxation clears committee, setting stage for final legalization bill, HARTFORD
COURANT, May 2, 2019, 2019 WLNR 13597382; Tom Schuba, Full, 300-page pot legalization bill
could be introduced in Illinois within days, CHI. SUN TIMES, Apr. 30, 2019, 2019 WLNR
13512198; Brent Johnson, Sweeney: ‘50-50’ chance pot bill passes in May, STAR-LEDGER, May 1,
2019, 2019 WLNR 13518623.
215. Another possibility is that national legislation would legalize the possession and
transfer of marijuana only for medical purposes. This might be an interim step toward national
legalization for all purposes. However, national legalization only for medical purposes would
leave open the issues discussed in Part III.C above.
216. 545 U.S. 1, 15 (2005).
217. Id. at 18.
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would similarly be valid, even as to “purely local activities” within a
particular state.
Under this national legalization approach, property rights would
clearly exist in marijuana in all states as a matter of federal law.218
Presumably, such a statute would expressly provide that it preempts
any contrary state laws, so that no uncertainty about preemption
would arise. This would end the current impasse, but potentially leave
an open issue: Would the recognition of marijuana property have
retroactive effect?
There is a compelling argument that marijuana property already
exists today in legalization states, as discussed in Part II above.
However, a national legalization statute should retroactively validate
marijuana property rights to obviate any lingering uncertainty. Today
millions of people and tens of thousands of businesses rely on the
existence of these rights as a practical matter, even though the legal
status of marijuana property remains officially unsettled.219
Federal courts traditionally presume that a statute does not have
retroactive effect “absent clear congressional intent favoring such a
result.”220 This presumption is applied most frequently in cases
involving new legislation “affecting contractual or property rights,
matters in which predictability and stability are of prime
importance.”221 In the context of marijuana property, however,
predictability and stability would be enhanced—not imperiled—by
retroactive application. For this reason, a court might choose not to
apply the presumption. To avoid uncertainty, however, Congress
should expressly provide that a national legalization statute has
retroactive effect.
C. Impact of State-Option Legalization
The more likely near-term approach would be federal legislation
that, by analogy to the historic treatment of alcoholic beverages,
amends the CSA to provide that each state may legalize the
possession and transfer of marijuana at its option.222 This recalibration
could be accomplished through legislation that deletes the reference
to “marihuana” in Schedule 1 of the CSA, without preempting
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.

See supra the analysis in Part II.
See supra text accompanying notes 57–58.
Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 280 (1994).
Id. at 271.
See Chemerinsky et al., supra note 4, at 116–22 (advocating this approach).
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contrary state laws.223 Of course, this state-option approach would not
resolve the interstate conflict problems discussed in Part III above.
Driven by religious beliefs and health concerns, early twentiethcentury reformers mounted a successful campaign to amend the
Constitution to ban alcoholic beverages. In 1919, the Eighteenth
Amendment accordingly prohibited the “manufacture, sale, or
transportation of intoxicating liquors within [and] the importation
thereof into . . . the United States . . . for beverage purposes . . . .”224
The Twenty-first Amendment repealed this prohibition in 1933 but
provided that any state could restrict such beverages at its option.225
Its second clause stated that the “transportation or importation into
any State . . . for delivery or use therein of intoxicating liquors, in
violation of the laws thereof, is hereby prohibited.”226 Accordingly,
today each state has the power to restrict the distribution and use of
alcoholic beverages.227 This power is typically delegated to the county
level and, as a result, today “dry counties” exist in some states where
the sale of alcohol is either prohibited or tightly controlled.228
A confluence of public opinion, political reality, and federalism
theory is fueling movement toward this state-option approach.229
Although there is determined opposition to national legalization,230 a
recent poll shows that 74% of Americans favor “protecting states that

223. Alternatively, marijuana could be removed from Schedule I by an administrative
decision of the Drug Enforcement Administration. For a discussion of past efforts to
administratively reclassify marijuana, see UELMEN & KREIT, supra note 63, at § 3:85. This
approach would not resolve the interstate conflicts discussed in Part III above.
224. U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII, § 1. Notably, the amendment did not prohibit the
possession of alcoholic beverages. As a result, alcoholic beverages were not classified as
contraband per se and could thus be the subject of property rights.
225. U.S. CONST. amend. XXI, § 1.
226. Id. § 2 (emphasis added).
227. But see Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 493 (2005) (holding that states do not have
the power to prohibit interstate shipments of alcohol).
228. See Hunter Schwarz, Where in the United States you can’t purchase alcohol, WASH.
POST, Sept. 2, 2014, https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/govbeat/wp/2014/09/02/where-inthe-united-states-you-cant-purchase-alcohol/ (identifying ten states that allow counties to
criminalize the sale or purchase of alcohol).
229. Bills implementing this approach have been introduced in Congress. See, e.g.,
Marijuana Freedom and Opportunity Act, S. 3174, 115th Cong. (2018); Strengthening the Tenth
Amendment Through Entrusting States Act, S. 3032, 115th Cong. (2018); see also
Compassionate Access, Research Expansion, and Respect States Act of 2017, H.R. 2920, 115th
Cong. (2017) (providing an exception for marijuana use for medical purposes if allowed by state
law).
230. Quinnipiac University Poll, supra note 138. Although 63% of Americans favor the
national legalization of marijuana, most Republicans disagree: 41% favor this step, while 55%
oppose it. Id.
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have legalized medical or recreational marijuana from federal
prosecution.”231 A variety of political figures,232 including President
Trump,233 have expressed support for this approach because it
accommodates the current political reality that states remain divided
on two key questions: (1) Should marijuana be legalized at all? (2) If
so, should it be legalized only for medical use or also for recreational
use? Finally, this approach is consistent with our tradition of
federalism, under which states are afforded broad discretion in areas
of social and economic policy. As the Supreme Court acknowledged in
Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona Independent Restricting
Commission, it “long recognized the role of the States as laboratories
for devising solutions to difficult legal problems.”234
Under the state-option approach, property rights in marijuana
would clearly exist within legalization states because it would not be
contraband per se under federal law. But presumably some states
would retain their existing laws that criminalize its possession and
transfer; as a result, property rights in marijuana would not exist in
those states. This creates the risk that marijuana property conflicts
may arise between legalization states and ban states, despite the
solutions analyzed in Part III above.
Accordingly, federal legislation adopting the state-option
approach should expressly provide that ban states must respect the
existence of marijuana property in legalization states when interstate
conflicts occur, whether they arise from business transactions or
personal relationships. This would preclude a ban state from applying
its own law to effectively nullify property rights in marijuana located
outside of its borders.235

231. Id. Notably, the same poll indicated that 52% of Republicans favor this approach.
232. See, e.g., Dan Adams, Let states set own pot policies, Senator Warren says as she files
bill to bar federal interference, BOSTON GLOBE, June 7, 2018, https://www.bostonglobe.com/
2018/06/07/sen-warren-pushes-for-federal-clarity-marijuana/FhYzWQa6TJd4kEy9FN0z7I/
story.html (discussing support for state option approach by Senators Elizabeth Warren and
Cory Gardner).
233. Evan Halper, Trump inclined to back ending pot ban, L.A. TIMES, June 9, 2018, 2018
WLNR 17754974 (discussing President Trump saying that he would probably support a bill that
uses the state-option approach).
234. 135 S. Ct. 2652, 2673 (2015) (quoting Oregon v. Ice, 555 U.S. 160, 171 (2009)); see also
New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 211 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“It is one of the
happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous state may . . . serve as a
laboratory; and try novel social . . . experiments without risk to the rest of the country.”).
235. In addition, legislation implementing this approach should be retroactive for the
reasons discussed in Part IV.B.
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CONCLUSION
In sum, marijuana can be owned under state law despite
conflicting federal law. Yet the hybrid property system produced by
this divergence will generate uncertainty—and thus litigation—until
either judicial decisions better chart the terrain between state and
federal law or marijuana property is legalized through nationwide
legislation. In the interim, legalization states and ban states will
struggle with a similar challenge in the interstate setting.
More broadly, sovereign conflicts over the existence of property
rights are inevitable in our federal system. The rights recognized by a
particular state will sometimes be inconsistent with federal law or
with the law of other states. After the current impasse over marijuana
property is finally resolved, the problem will recur in other contexts.
Although the question of marijuana ownership has unique facets, the
approaches analyzed in this Article may provide a useful framework
for navigating future conflicts.
Given the dominant role that state law plays in defining property
rights under the Tenth Amendment, federal preemption of such rights
should rarely occur. When it does, federal and state authorities will be
confronted with a hybrid system where property exists under state law
but not under federal law. But ultimately these conflicting sovereigns
will need to accept a certain amount of inconsistency between their
approaches.
Conflicts between states over property rights raise different
problems due to the impossibility of preemption. Private actors can
circumvent this jurisdictional inconsistency to some extent through
litigation strategy, choice-of-law clauses, or alternative dispute
resolution techniques. Where these approaches are not used, the
forum state should give appropriate deference to the law of the situs
state, consistent with the traditional view that the situs state has the
greater interest in the application of its own law.
Ultimately, federalism is “messy, untidy, and always a little out of
control,” as Charles Handy observes.236 Our goal in dealing with
marijuana ownership should be to reduce the systemic friction
produced by federal-state conflicts and interstate conflicts, while
appreciating that complete harmonization of property law doctrines is

236. CHARLES HANDY, THE AGE OF PARADOX 111 (1994).
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both unlikely to occur and arguably counterproductive given the
traditional role of the states as laboratories of democracy.

